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CASE NOTES
Admiralty-Seaman Not Required to Exhaust Grievance Procedures Pro-
vided In Collective Bargaining Agreement Before Instituting Wage Claim.-
Plaintiff was aboard his employer's ship on six-month articles of employment.
When the six month period came to a close on February 3, 1966, the ship was
waiting its turn to discharge its cargo in a harbor near Saigon. After a ten-day
delay, the ship docked and began to discharge its cargo on February 16. The
following day plaintiff was paid by voucher at the American Consulate in
Saigon and repatriated to the United States. He finally arrived at the office of
Bulk Carriers in Galveston, Texas, on February 22, and was paid the amount
specified in the voucher. The seaman claimed that he was entitled to overtime
wages in addition to the amount paid to him; and instead of invoking the
grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement between his union"
and employer, he brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, at Baltimore, against his employer for overtime wages and
statutory penalties for late payment of wages under the Seamen's Wage Act of
1915.2 The district court granted the employer summary judgment3 for the
reason that the seaman had not exhausted the grievance procedure provided in
the collective bargaining agreement. The United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit, reversed and remanded to the district court to decide certain
factual questions. 4 Arguelles v. US. Bulk Carriers, Inc., 408 F.2d 1065 (4th
Cir. 1969), appeal docketed, No. 284 (U.S. June 26, 1969).
A seaman's claim for wages has always been regarded as a "sacred claim;" 5
and because of his perilous and indispensable service to the country, he has
1. National Maritime Union of America, an affiliate of the AFL-CIO.
2. 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1964). Section 596 provides in substance that the master or owner of
a ship making foreign voyages must pay to each seaman his wages within twenty-four hours
after the cargo has been discharged, or within four days after the seaman has been dis-
charged whichever happens first. In all cases the seaman must be paid at the time of his
discharge on account of wages a sum equal to one-third of the amount due him. If a master
or owner refuses or neglects to make payment in this manner without sufficient cause, he
must pay to the seaman a sum equal to twq days' pay for each day during which payment
is delayed beyond the respective periods, which sum shall be recoverable as wages in any
claim made before the court.
3. Arguelles v. U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc., 408 F.2d 1065, 1069 (4th Cir. 1969), appeal
docketed, No. 284 (U.S. June 26, 1969).
4. The factual questions involved were: "(1) Whether the plaintiff was entitled to
overtime compensation during his period of service aboard ship prior and subsequent to
February 3, 1966; (2) whether the master's delay of fifteen days after February 3, 1966,
in the payment of plaintiff's wages was 'without sufficient cause' within the meaning of
§ 596." 408 F.2d at 1068.
5. The Saxpul Little, 221 F. 308, 310 (2d Cir. 1915).
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been blessed with the title "ward of the admiralty."0 Consequently, throughout
the years, he has been protected from his own carelessness.7
The wage statutes were originally enacted as public policy statutes 8 at a
time when seamen were said to be in need of special protection.9 Their purpose
was "to secure prompt payment of seamen's wages and thus protect them from
harsh consequences of arbitrary and unscrupulous action of their employers."'1
The statutes are generally considered to be penal in nature" but are construed
liberally for the benefit of the seaman.12
6. Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934); Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.,
121 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 684 (1941); Parodi v. American President
Lines, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Kalantzis v. Mesar, 132 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.
Va. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 245 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1957); Petterson v. United States, 274
F. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Indicative of the seaman's favored status in the early nineteenth
century is Justice Story's famous opinion: "[Seamen] are emphatically the wards of tie
admiralty; and though not technically incapable of entering into a valid contract, they
are treated in the same manner, as courts of equity are accustomed to treat young heirs,
dealing with their expectancies, wards with their guardians .... " Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.
Cas. 480, 485 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
7. In 1897, the Supreme Court considered the "ward of the admiralty" characterization
'(even more accurate now than it was formerly." Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 287
(1897). Thirty-five years later Justice Cardozo reaffirmed the Court's position In Cortes v.
Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 377 (1932).
As late as 1951, Martin Norris pointed out the lack of change in admiralty case law
and referred to seamen today as "perhaps better educated and better dressed . . . but, in
general, as improvident and prone to the extremes of trust and suspicion as their for-
bears . . . " Preface to 1 M. Norris, The Law of Seamen (1st ed. 1951).
8. 408 F.2d at 1069-71; Samad v. The Etivebank, 134 F. Supp. 530, 536 (E.D. Va.
1955).
9. In 1839, Judge Ware spoke of the necessity of such protective laws when he referred
to seamen as "ignorant, improvident, and necessitous . . . wholly unable to defend their
rights against the superior knowledge, sagacity, and wealth of their employers." The David
Pratt, 7 F. Cas. 22, 24 (No. 3597) (D.C. Me. 1839). The first wage statute was passed in
1790. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 6, 1 Stat. 133.
10. Underwood v. Isbrandtsen Co., 100 F. Supp. 863, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also
Collie v. Fergusson, 281 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1930); Peterson v. S.S. Wahcondah, 235 F. Supp.
698 (ED. La. 1964). The courts have assigned more specific purposes to these laws, e.g.,
to prevent seamen from being put ashore without funds and consequently becoming a charge
upon the harbor where they disembark, Monteiro v. Sociedad Maritima San Nicolas, SA.,
280 F.2d 568, 574 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 915 (1960); Malanos v. Chandrts, 181
F. Supp. 189, 191 (N.D.N.Y. 1959), or "to shield seamen against pressure to release claims,
even ill-supported claims, by withholding from them sums as to which their right is
not in dispute." Prindes v. The S.S. African Pilgrim, 266 F.2d 125, 128 (4th Cir. 1959).
11. Chambers v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (ED. Pa.
1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1950); Butler v. United States War Shipping Adminis-
tration, 68 F. Supp. 441, 445 (ED. Pa. 1946); Petterson v. United States, 274 F. 1000,
1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
12. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942); Bainbridge v. Mer-
chants & Miners Transp. Co., 287 U.S. 278, 282 (1932); Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam
Navigation Co., 211 U.S. 239, 246 (1908); Forster v. Oro Navigation Co., 228 F.2d 319, 320
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Double wage penalties under § 596 are mandatory, and, while a judge can
use his discretion as to the length of time the employer is to be liable to the
seaman for double wages,'" once this period has been determined, he cannot
arbitrarily reduce the amount by considering the equities of the situation."
The strictness with which these penalties are to be enforced against the em-
ployer is illustrated by the fact that there are very few instances in which an
employer can justifiably deduct a portion of a seaman's wage before it is paid
to him; for "[t]he positive mandate of Sec. 596 . . . admits of no interpretation
by which any exceptions, other than those expressly provided by other sections
of the statute, can be allowed." 15 Thus not even medical expenses incurred by
a seaman can be deducted from his wages;'e nor can the cost of repatriation
be deducted, 17 even if the seaman is discharged for good cause.' 8
The defendent in Arguelles relied on Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox0 and
Vaca v. Sipesj both of which were decided on the basis of the 1957 decision in
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.2 1 Lincoln Mills involved a dispute
between a union and employer over work loads and assignments. A collective
bargaining agreement containing a no-strike provision was invoked; however,
at the final step, the employer refused to arbitrate. The Supreme Court decided
that § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act2 2 gave rise to a federal
(2d Cir. 1955), aff'g per curiam 128 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Johnson v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 190 F.2d 991, 993 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 US. 779 (1952); Shilman v. United
States, 164 F.2d 649, 651 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 US. 837 (1948).
13. Ventiadis v. C. J. Thibodeaux & Co., 295 F. Supp. 135, 138 (S.D. Tex. 1968);
Kontos v. SS. Sophie C., 236 F. Supp. 664, 674 (ED. Pa. 1964).
14. Swain v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 360 F.2d 81, 87 (3d Cir. 1966).
15. Johnson v. Isbrandtsen Co., 91 F. Supp. 872, 873 (ED. Pa. 1950), afPd, 190 F.2d
991 (3d Cir. 1951), afPd, 343 U.S. 779 (1952). 46 U.S.C. § 701 (1964) lists these exceptions,
e.g., desertion (ff 1), absence without leave (IIU 2-3), willful disobedience ([ 4-5), willfully
damaging the vessel (U 7), conviction for smuggling causing loss or damage to the master
or employer (ff 8).
16. Swain v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 360 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1966); Keen v. United States,
99 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aiPd mem., 199 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1952); Leahy v. United
States, 63 F. Supp. 11 (SD.N.Y. 1945).
17. Ventiadis v. Cj. Thibodeaux & Co., 295 F. Supp. 135 (SD. Tex. 1968).
18. Schwark v. S.S. Rio Macareo, 249 F. Supp. 375 (ED. La. 1966). See also Mavromatis
v. United Greek Shipowners Corp., 179 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1949) (deductions not allowed
for compulsory savings); Shilman v. United States, 164 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 837 (1948) (deduction not allowed for court martial fine).
The seaman's "sacred claim" is further protected by the fact that his wages are not subject
to deductions for advances in wages made by the employer before the seaman has earned
them. 46 US.C. § 599 (1964). In addition, the seaman is exempt from attachment of his
wages except for the support of his wife or minor children. 46 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV, 1969).
19. 379 US. 650 (1965).
20. 386 US. 171 (1967).
21. 353 US. 448 (1957).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964). This section provides that: "Suits for violation of con-
tracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may
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substantive body of law "which the courts must fashion from the policy of
our national labor laws."' 3 The decision construed § 301 (a) as giving the courts
power specifically to enforce agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes.2 4
Before the Lincoln Mills decision in 1957, Jones v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co.25 stood as an obstacle to arbitration of the employment type of dis-
pute presented in Arguelles. Jones involved substantially the same facts as
Arguelles. The seaman sued for penalty wages under § 596. In Jones, however,
defendant filed a motion for a stay of proceedings under the provisions of the
Arbitration Act. 26 The court granted a stay order to compel the parties to
arbitrate pursuant to the collective bargaining provisions in their contract. "7
However, in a subsequent disposition of the case,28 the court realized it had
misinterpreted the Act because § 1 specifically excluded "contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce" 29 from the scope of the Act. The stay order,
therefore, was vacated. 0 The case indicated that an employer of seamen or
other workers engaged in interstate commerce had no means whereby he could
force his employees to arbitrate under the Arbitration Act. This, in effect, ex-
cluded the majority of such labor disputes from arbitration.3 '
However, since the Lincoln Mills decision six years later found a body of
substantive law bestowing on federal courts the power to decree specific per-
formance of agreements to arbitrate labor disputes,3 2 it became unnecessary
to employ the Arbitration Act to force a stay of proceedings. The employer
could compel arbitration under § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act.3 3 Since § 301 (a) did not exclude from its scope contracts of employment
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties."
23. 353 U.S. at 456.
24. Id. at 451. The trilogy of steelworker cases later clarified this holding by limiting
the function of the courts to deciding whether the arbitration clause was broad enough
to encompass the alleged dispute, leaving the interpretation of the contract and the merits
of the dispute to the arbitrator. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
25. 98 F. Supp. 787 (1951), order vacated, 107 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
26. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1964). These sections make a written arbitration provision in a
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce valid and
allow for a stay of court proceedings if there is an issue referable to arbitration.
27. 98 F. Supp. at 788-89.
28. Jones v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 107 F. Supp. 157 (WD. Pa. 1952).
29. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
30. 107 F. Supp. at 158.
31. Lincoln Mills by implication indicated collective bargaining agreements were In-
cluded in the concept of "contracts of employment" and thus the Arbitration Act could
not be invoked to obtain a stay in a dispute arising from a collective bargaining agreement.
See Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion. 353 U.S. at 466-69.
32. 353 U.S. at 455.
33. Id.
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of seamen and other workers engaged in interstate commerce, an employer
who hired such employees then had a remedy to enforce arbitration agree-
ments. Thus the decision in Jones v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co.
34 might
have been different had the case arisen after Lincoln Mills.35
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox38 and Vaca v. Sipes"7 further interpreted
§ 301 (a) as requiring an employee to exhaust all grievance procedures in a col-
lective bargaining agreement before bringing suit in the appropriate court.
Maddox involved a dispute over severance pay initiated by a mining employee
who was laid off as a result of his employer's closing down the mine where
Maddox worked. A collective bargaining agreement between his employer and
his union contained a provision for severance pay if Maddox should be laid
off due to a permanent closing of the mine. According to the agreement, dis-
putes were to be settled by a grievance procedure followed by binding arbitra-
tion. Maddox, however, elected to sue for breach of contract instead of invoking
the grievance procedure. 38 The Supreme Court, interpreting § 301(a), ruled
that Maddox could not bypass the grievance procedures. The Court said that
"[t]he suit by Maddox clearly falls within the terms of the statute and within
the principles of Lincoln Mills, and because we see no reason for creating an
exception, we conclude that the general federal rule applies. 30
Sipes involved the suit of an employee against his employer for wrongful
discharge. After being dismissed from work because of poor health, the em-
ployee invoked the grievance procedure which his union pursued until the final
step of arbitration. Having concluded that the employee's health was not suf-
ficient to continue working, the union decided not to arbitrate. The Supreme
Court, clarifying Maddox, held that an employee not only has to attempt to
exhaust his grievance procedures before he can bring suit, but, in a case such
as this, he must also show that the union breached its duty of fair representa-
tion in handling the employee's grievance4 0 Thus, failing to do so, the em-
ployee had no remedy in court.
In Arguelles, defendant conceded that Maddox and Sipes involved federal
labor law; 41 but he contended that their principles were applied to the maritime
area in Freedman v. National Maritime Union42 and Brandt v. United States
Lines, Inc.43 Both cases involved § 301 suits for improper discharge. In both
34. 107 F. Supp. 157 (W.). Pa. 1952).
35. While the contract of employment of the seaman in the Jones case was excluded from
the scope of the Arbitration Act, it would have come under the substantive law of § 301(a)
as indicated by the Lincoln Mills decision.
36. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
37. 386 US. 171 (1967).
38. 379 U.S. at 650-51.
39. Id. at 657.
40. 386 U.S. at 184-86. "[The employee] could not have established a breach of that
duty merely by convincing the jury that he was in fact fit for work . . . ; he must also
have proved arbitrary or bad-faith conduct on the part of the Union in processing his
grievance.' Id. at 193.
41. 408 F.2d at 1071.
42. 347 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 917 (1966).
43. 246 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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it appeared that the seaman's union had investigated the facts, had concluded
that the discharge was for proper cause, and had refused to continue grievance
procedures. In Freedman the court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment
verdict in favor of the defendant because of the lack of any genuine issue of
material fact. 44 In Brandt, the court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment because "[t]here [were] no facts alleged from which a court or jury
could reasonably find that the Union acted arbitrarily or in a discriminatory
manner."
45
While the court in Arguelles conceded that Freedman and Brandt involved
disputes maritime in nature, it nevertheless distinguished these two decisions,
along with the Maddox and Sipes cases, on the ground that the substance of
their disputes differed from that in Arguelles.40 Freedman and Brandt involved
disputes arising directly out of a right created by private collective bargaining
agreements and the Maddox and Sipes cases found this right to be within the
scope of § 301. In Arguelles, however, the court noted, the right involved was
created by Congress and was based upon the violation of "rights created by a
federal statute which applies solely to seamen and the payment of their
wages. " 47 This right is, therefore, independent of the collective bargaining
agreement. There was, furthermore, a genuine issue of fact4" to be decided in
Arguelles which eliminated the possibility of granting a motion for summary
judgment as was done in Freedman and Brandt.49
Thus the problem in Arguelles which demanded examination was whether
federal wage statutes can be circumvented by a private collective bargaining
agreement. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered this ques-
tion in a 1944 case50 similar to Arguelles involving § 596 of the Seamen's Wage
Act. Circuit Judge Chase there held that "we think that such requirement [to
submit their grievance to arbitration] was in derogation of the libellants' abso-
lute right to immediate payment, as guaranteed by our statute, and as such is
void."51
It has also been held that a private agreement between a seaman and em-
44. 347 F.2d at 168.
45. 246 F. Supp. at 984.
46. 408 F.2d at 1071.
47. Id. 46 U.S.C. § 596 has been in existence in various forms since 1790. Its fore-
runners were: Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 6, 1 Stat. 133; Act of June 7, 1872, ch. 322,
§ 35, 17 Stat. 269.
48. See note 4 supra.
49. See, e.g., Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 384 F.2d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1968); Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co., 377 F.2d 864,
871 (2d Cir. 1967); Salyer v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 364,
365 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
50. Glandzis v. Callinicos, 140 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1944). This case involved a refusal by
an employer to pay seamen upon their discharge a special bonus provided for In a written
agreement. The court held that this bonus was included in the term "wages" under § 596.
Id. at 113-14.
51. Id. at 114.
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ployer to postpone payment of wages is void,52 as well as an agreement whereby
an employer is to deposit part of a seaman's wages in a bank.5 3
Thus the case law seems to indicate that the wage statutes in the Seamen's
Wage Act create an absolute right for the seaman to sue for his wages despite
any private agreement to the contrary; and, as such, these statutes constitute an
exception to the § 301 rule requiring, as interpreted by Maddox, exhaustion of
grievance procedures before the courts can become available for redressing
complaints.
There is an analogous situation in the case of railroad employees, another
favored class of workers. The 1941 case of Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R.54 dealt
with a suit by a railroad employee for wrongful discharge. Mr. Justice Black
there interpreted the Railway Labor Act of 193455 as not requiring an employee
to exhaust his grievance remedies before seeking judicial redress for wrongful
discharge.5 6 And in 1953, 57 applying the Moore rule, the Supreme Court held
that if an employee accepts his dismissal as final, he may sue in court for
wrongful discharge. 58 The Court, however, went on to note that if state law
requires resort to grievance procedures first, then the employee must follow
the state rule.59
This exception to § 301(a) was weakened considerably by the Maddox case
in 1965. In Maddox, Justice Harlan pointed out that "a major underpinning
for the continued validity of the Moore case in the field of the Railway Labor
Act, and more importantly in the present context, for the extension of its
rationale to suits under § 301(a) of the LMRA, has been removed."' O
The question of whether the Railway Labor Act exception should be over-
ruled in light of the Maddox decision presented itself in 1966 in the case of
52. Kalantzis v. Mesar, 132 F. Supp. 745, 749 (ED. Va. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 245
F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1957); The Constellation, 20 F. Supp. 892, 893 (E.1).N.Y. 1937); The
City of Montgomery, 210 F. 673, 675-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
53. Venides v. United Greek Shipowners Corp., 168 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1948); Lakos v.
Saliaris, 116 F.2d 440, 443-44 (4th Cir. 1940). See also Forster v. Oro Navigation Co., 128
F. Supp. 113, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd per curin, 228 F.2d 319 (2d Cr. 1955) (Private
agreement between union and employer fixing amount of penalty for delayed payment of
overtime wages is unenforceable.).
54. 312 U.S. 630 (1941).
55. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1969). The Act creates the National
Railroad Adjustment Board having exclusive jurisdiction over minor disputes between
railroad employees and employers.
56. 312 US. at 636.
57. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953). Note that 45
U.S.C. § 185 (1964) makes the provisions of § 153 applicable to air carriers with an added
provision for a National Air Transport Adjustment Board when it becomes necessary.
58. 345 U.S. at 660-61.
59. Id. at 660-62.
60. 379 US. at 655. Justice Black remarks that "[tjhe Court recognizes the relevance
of Moore and Koppal and, while declining expressly to overrule them in this case, has
raised the overruling axe so high that its falling is just about as certain as the changing
of the seasons." (Emphasis omitted). Id. at 667 (dissenting opinion).
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Walker v. Southern Ry. 6 ' Unexpectedly the Court, in a 6-3 decision, refused
to overrule Moore and instead relied upon its principle in deciding the case.
02
The Court's adherence to Moore seemed to be predicated on the practical
observation that railroad employees had to wait as long as ten years before
their grievances could be processed before the National Railroad Adjustment
Board 3 and on the fact that the 1966 amendment to the Railway Labor Act,0'
which revised the procedures for remedying grievances, 65 were not available
to the plaintiff in that case. 60 Thus, while Moore is still being followed in most
courts,67 the 1966 amendment, along with the favoritism the courts have
demonstrated toward enforcing collective bargaining procedures since the Lin-
coln Mills case,68 indicates that the Moore exception may be short-lived.;
In 1968, the District Court for the Southern District of New York in Jones
v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines7" had before it the same issues presented
in Arguelles. The district court dismissed the suit based on findings that the
plaintiff had in fact not performed the overtime work in question 1 and that
he had signed a valid release upon his discharge giving up any further claim
for wages. 72 But the court added that since the collective bargaining agreement
between the seaman's union and his employer provided a grievance procedure
for settling wage disputes, that procedure must be resorted to before plaintiff
can have recourse to the courts.
7 3
The influence of the Maddox and Sipes rationale 4 is evident in the American
61. 385 U.S. 196 (1966) (per curiam), modified, 386 U.S. 988 (1967).
62. 385 U.S. at 198-99.
63. Id. at 198.
64. Act of June 20, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-456, §§ 1-2, 80 Stat. 208, amending 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 (Second) (1964) [codified as 45 U.S.C. § 153 (Second) (Supp. 1969)].
65. The new procedures provide for the creation, within thirty days after a written
request by either the employer or union, of a two-member special board of adjustment in
order to resolve disputes otherwise referable to the Adjustment Board or disputes which
have been pending before the Adjustment Board for a year. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (Second)
(Supp. 1969).
66. 385 U.S. at 198-99. The following year the Supreme Court granted a motion to
recall and amend the judgment in Walker, and the case was remanded to the United States
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, for further disposition. 386 U.S. 988 (1967).
67. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 400 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1968);
Belanger v. New York Cent. R.R., 384 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1967); Sturno v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968); Dominguez
v. National Airlines, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
68. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
69. See Slagley v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 397 F.2d 946, 549 n.3 (7th Cir. 1968).
70. 285 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
71. Id. at 347-48.
72. Id. at 349.
73. Id. at 349-50.
74. The court in the Jones case further states that "[in the absence of evidence tending
to show that the Union acted in bad faith or that it abused its discretion with respect to
the processing of libellant's grievances, the libellant is precluded from seeking redress In
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Export decision and it can safely be said that the reasoning in American Export
reflects a recent trend in the field of labor relations favoring arbitration of dis-
putes when possible,75 regardless of who the parties are.
The wage statutes were enacted to elevate the seaman to a bargaining posi-
tion equal to his employer. This purpose has been accomplished with simul-
taneous help from unions emerging as powerful bargaining representatives for
seamen. Exclusiveness of remedy has been largely responsible for the growth
of unions to their present status. 76 The issue in Arguelles thus centers on the
question of whether union procedure can operate side by side with the seamen's
wage statutes. Since resort to grievance procedure does not necessarily deprive
a seaman of his right to wages but merely alters the process by which he can
obtain that right, it would seem that there is room for union grievance proce-
dures to operate within § 596 of the Seamen's Wage Act. Under this view a col-
lective bargaining agreement would not circumvent the statute; it would provide
a means of enforcing the statute's provisions and at the same time remain con-
sistent with the strong federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes.
This federal policy, signified by the emergence of a substantive law under § 301
(a) supplying a broader and more effective means of enforcing arbitration
agreements than the Arbitration Act and by the current disfavor of the exemp-
tion from bargaining requirements allowed to railroad employees, leads to the
conclusion that the seamen's wage claim exception to the Maddox rule may be
approaching perilous waters in the federal courts.
Admiralty-Workmen's Compensation-Jurisdiction of Federal Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927 Held Not
to Extend to Longshoremen Injured on a Pier While Engaged in Maritime
Activities.--Petitioners, longshoremen, were all injured on a pier while loading
a vessel lying in navigable waters. All applied for compensation under the
Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act of 1927. The deputy com-
missioner denied recovery on the ground that the injury did not take place
"upon navigable waters" as required by the Act. The district court in each
the courts where the grievance procedures provided for by contract have not been pursued!'
Id. at 350.
75. "The entire import of the Supreme Court cases beginning with Lincoln Mills, through
the trilogy of the Steelworker cases . . . is that arbitration, when agreed upon by the
parties, is the best method for reconciliation of disputes arising out of collective agreements.
Where an arbitration clause admits of a construction including the dispute in question within
its ambit, recourse to the courts before any effort is made to process the dispute through
arbitration is to be looked upon with disfavor." Belk v. Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 315 F2d
513, 517 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 847 (1963). See also Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v.
Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969); H. K. Porter Co. v. Local 37, United Steelworkers,
400 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1968).
76. See Judge Haynsworth's dissenting opinion in Arguelles. 408 F.2d at 1072-73.
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case affirmed the commissioner's findings.' The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed 2 and certiorari was granted.3 The United
States Supreme Court, Mr. Justice White, held that "upon the navigable
waters" did not include injuries on piers and wharves even though they extend
over navigable waters, and the injured parties are engaged in a traditionally
maritime activity. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
In 1917, the Supreme Court ruled that recovery for fatal injuries incurred
by a stevedore on the gangway of a ship under the New York workmen's com-
pensation statute was unconstitutional. 4 Both the situs of the injury and the
type of work being performed were clearly maritime, and thus within the ex-
clusive federal admiralty jurisdiction. If individual state statutes were allowed
to apply, "[t]he necessary consequence would be destruction of the very uni-
formity in respect to maritime matters which the constitution was designed to
establish." 5 Since at this time there was no federal workmen's compensation
law, the immediate effect of the ruling was to deprive longshoremen injured
seaward of the pier of any workmen's compensation remedy whatsoever. These
workers were left with only their common law tort remedy which was subject
to the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the
fellow servant doctrine. 6 Those injured on the landward side of the pier were
deemed to be properly within the state's jurisdiction and were able to proceed
under state compensation statutes.7
1. East v. Oosting, 245 F. Supp. 51 (ED. Va. 1965); Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp.
184 (D. Md. 1965). The cases were then consolidated on appeal. In a fourth case an award
to a longshoreman who drowned after being knocked off a pier into the water was affirmed
by both the district court and the court of appeals. Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting,
398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S.
212 (1969).
2. 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).
3. 393 U.S. 976 (1968).
4. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
5. Id. at 217. Federal jurisdiction in admiralty matters is derived from art. III, § 2 of
the Constitution: "The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases of Admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction." By § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the district courts of the
United States were given "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction." 1 Stat. 76-77, as amended and codified, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1964).
6. § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76-77, as amended and codified, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1) (1964), contains the "saving to suitors" clause which preserves all common law
remedies "where the common law is competent to give it." Id. at 77. As Mr. Justice McRey-
nolds pointed out in Jensen, however, workman's compensation was a remedy wholly
unknown at common law and thus not saved to suitors from the grant of exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the federal courts. 244 U.S. at 218. Admiralty jurisdiction, prior to the 1948
Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964), required that both the commission and
consummation of the tort occur on navigable waters; accordingly, the tort remedy was
available only at common law. See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866). Admiralty
tort law is not subject to the defenses of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk.
See The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
7. Piers, wharves and docks had traditionally been held to be extensions of the land and
thus validly within the states' jurisdiction to regulate. State Indus. Comm'n v. Nordenholt
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Congress twice attempted to remedy this situation by delegating its jurisdic-
tion over maritime claims so that state compensation laws would apply.8 How-
ever, the Supreme Court struck down both of these acts on the grounds that
they were an unlawful delegation of Federal Power.9 In an attempt to mitigate
the harsh result of Jensen the Supreme Court in Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co.
v. Rohde,'0 allowed recovery under state compensation laws to a carpenter who
was injured while working in the hold of a partially completed vessel that was
lying in navigable waters. Mr. Justice McReynolds, again writing for the ma-
jority, enunciated the famous "maritime but local doctrine," which held that
injuries that resulted from work that was not traditionally maritime in nature
and which did not have any direct relation to navigation or commerce were
compensable under state laws, regardless of the fact that the injury occurred
upon navigable waters, i.e., seaward of the Jensen line."' After Rohde there
grew up an extensive body of case law which employed the "maritime but
local" test to allow compensation for maritime injuries under state statutes.'2
In 1927, in response to a suggestion by the Supreme Court,13 Congress en-
acted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.' 4 The Act
Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922); Cleveland Terminal & V. R.R. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 203 U.S.
316 (1908). See also note 61 infra. In Nordenholt, the Supreme Court upheld recovery
under a state workmen's compensation statute for injuries received by a longshoreman
on the pier while engaged in unloading a ship lying in navigable waters. The "Jensen Line"
was thus established. The dividing line between federal and state jurisdiction was fixed at
the seaward edge of the pier.
8. Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634; Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395.
9. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
10. 257 US. 469 (1922).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 276 US. 467 (1928) (seaman
attempting to launch a stranded boat) ; M&iller's Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S.
59 (1926) (diver killed while removing underwater obstruction); Zahler v. Department of
Labor, 125 Wash. 410, 217 P. 55 (1923) (carpenter killed while working on an incompleted
ship lying in navigable waters); 3 A. Larsen, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 89.22
(1968); Annot., 56 A.L.R. 352 (1928).
13. In Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924), a deision which
invalidated a congressional attempt to extend the jurisdiction of a state compensation statute,
the Supreme Court noted: 'Tithout doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise
the maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment. This
power, we think, would permit enactment of a general employers' liability law or general
provisions for compensating injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the several
States." Id. at 227.
14. Act of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964). Section
903(a) sets forth the jurisdictional requirements: "Compensation shall be payable under this
chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death
results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including
any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation
proceedings may not validly be provided by State law."
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provided compensation for those employees 5 injured "upon the navigable
waters of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the
disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not
validly be provided by state law." 16 The jurisdictional section was poorly
worded at best, and open to several possible interpretations. First, the Act em-
bodied the Rohde line of cases and would continue to allow state recovery in
a "maritime but local" situation, since recovery in a "maritime but local"
situation could validly be provided by state law. Federal jurisdiction would be
limited under this interpretation to cases where both the situs and status of
the injury and injured party were maritime. Second, the Act did not embody
the Rohde's line of cases but intended to cover all injuries on navigable waters.
The "and if" clause then became merely redundant and the Rohde's line of
cases were to be disregarded as inconsistent with Jensen. Third, the wording of
the jurisdictional provision was so ambiguous that in a proper situation recovery
under either the federal or the relevant state compensation statute would be
upheld by the courts.17
As could be expected, this section brought heavy litigation and wide diver-
gence of opinion as to the exact meaning of its language.
The lower federal courts held that recovery under the federal act was valid
only where state coverage was precluded by the Constitution. This led to the
use of the "maritime but local" doctrine as a defense to federal compensation
claims under the Longshoremen's Act on the grounds that state compensation
could have validly been applied.' 8 Ironically, the "maritime but local" doctrine
originally sprung up to alleviate the harsh result of Jensen which prohibited
state workmen's compensation to employees injured seaward of the pier. This
interpretation clearly frustrated the purpose of the statute which was to provide
a quick, uncomplicated compensation remedy for those injured employees held
to be outside the jurisdiction of the state act.
Finally, in 1941, in Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc.,'9 the Supreme Court
addressed itself to the problem of the extent of concurrent jurisdiction between
the federal and state compensation acts. In Parker an employee of the Motor
Boat Co., who was hired principally as a janitor, was drowned when a boat in
15. The Act specifically omitted from coverage a master or member of the crew of any
vessel. It was the intent of Congress in passing this Act to fill the gap and to provide
coverage for those people who were neither covered by the Jones Act nor the state com-
pensation act. See Hearings on S. 3170 before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-31 (1926).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
17. For a somewhat confusing discussion of congressional intent, see Longshoremen's Act,
Op. No. 30, United States Employees' Compensation Comm., Washington, Jan. 26, 1928, 1
A.M.C. 417 (1928).
18. Motor Boat Sales, Inc. v. Parker, 116 F.2d 789 (4th Cir.), rev'd, 314 U.S. 244
(1941); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Marshall, 95 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1938); New Amsterdam
Cas. Co. v. McManigal, 87 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1937); United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64
F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 639 (1933).
19. 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
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which he was riding capsized. The deputy commissioner had awarded compen-
sation on the basis of the federal act, holding that the death occurred in the
course of employment and upon navigable waters. The district court sustained
the award, but the court of appeals reversed 20 on two grounds. First, the em-
ployee was not acting in the course of his employment at the time of the acci-
dent and second, a literal reading of section 903(a) barred recovery where a
state act could validly be applied. 2' The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated
the award.22 Mr. Justice Black found that there was dearly enough evidence
to support the commissioner's finding that the employee was acting in the
course of his employment, and the court of appeals should have accepted this
finding as final.23 The court then discussed the jurisdictional problem raised
by section 903 (a) of the Act. Noting that Congress certainly could have pro-
vided coverage in this situation, the question was whether Congress had so
provided in this statute. If the proviso in section 903(a) were not present,
Justice Black argued, there would be no difficulty at all in concluding that it
had. While this section "appears to be a subtraction from the scope of the
Act thus outlined by Congress, we believe that, properly interpreted, it is not
a large enough subtraction to place this case outside the coverage which Con-
gress intended to provide." 24 By this act Congress intended to provide federal
compensation coverage in an area which specific Supreme Court decisions;5 had
placed beyond the reach of the states.
"The proviso permitting recovery only when compensation 'may not validly be pro-
vided by State law' cannot be read in a manner that would defeat this purpose. An
interpretation which would enlarge or contract the effect of the proviso in accordance
with whether this Court rejected or reaffirmed the constitutional basis of the Jensen
and its companion cases cannot be acceptable. The result of such an interpretation
would be to subject the scope of protection that Congress wished to provide, to
uncertainties that Congress wished to avoid."2"
The Court avoided the question, however, of whether or not state compen-
sation could validly be provided.2 7 Justice Black stated that it made no differ-
20. 116 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1941).
21. Id. at 791-96. Since the boat company did not have enough employees to bring it
under the Virginia compensation statute, this decision left the plaintiff without a compen-
sation remedy. The court of appeals termed this result "unfortunate and regrettable" but
held that it was their function to interpret and construe statutes, not to make them, noting
that "[w]e cannot obey the Shakespearian maxim and wrest the law to our authority, even
once." Id. at 796.
22. 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
23. Id. at 246.
24. Id. at 249.
25. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
26. 314 U.S. at 249-50.
27. "What we are called upon to decide is not of constitutional magnitude....
... We believe that there is only one interpretation of the proviso ... which would accord
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ence that the claimant was primarily a non-maritime employee because he had
been injured on navigable waters. He failed even to mention the "maritime but
local" doctrine of Rohde, even though this was a classic maritime but local
situation. It could now be argued that the Court was back to the strict situs test
of Jensen and that state coverage was preempted seaward of the dock.
The sorely needed clarification of the jurisdictional section of the Longshore-
men's Act was not provided by the Supreme Court's next opinion on the subject
in Davis v. Department of Labor & Industries.28 There, decedent was engaged
in dismantling a bridge over navigable waters and stowing the sections on a
barge when he either fell or was knocked into the river. His representative
claimed an award under the state compensation law on the theory that de-
cedent's employment brought him within the "maritime but local" doctrine of
Rohde. Compensation was denied and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed.2"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.30 The Court was again
confronted with the question of the "maritime but local" doctrine versus ex-
clusive federal jurisdiction which it had avoided in the Parker case. 1 Mr.
Justice Black noted that the "maritime but local" doctrine's application had
not achieved satisfactory results. The failure of the Supreme Court to set forth
definitive guidelines had caused serious confusion to both claimants"2 and em-
ployers. "It is fair to say," the Court pointed out, "that a number of cases
with the aim of Congress; the field in which a state may not validly provide for compensa-
tion must be taken, for the purposes of the Act, as the same field which the Jensen line of
decision excluded from state compensation laws. Without affirming or rejecting the consti-
tutional implications of those cases, we accept them as the measure by which Congress in-
tended to mark the scope of the Act they brought into existence." Id. at 248, 250 (emphasis
deleted).
28. 317 U.S. 249 (1942). It was said of the case: "[a] year later Davis v. Department of
Labor and Industries of Washington gave an unexpected continuation to the discussion,
[maritime but local] together with an analysis of the rationale of the Motor Boat case
which, had it been suggested in a law review article, would have been dismissed as academic
fantasy bordering on insanity." G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 6-49, at
348 (1957) (footnote omitted).
29. Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 12 Wash. 2d 349, 121 P.2d 365 (1942). The
Washington court equated the work decedent was performing with that of a stevedore
loading and unloading a vessel on navigable waters which, according to the Jensen line
of decisions, was clearly outside the state's control. "[The Supreme Court] has uniformly
held that the 'loading and stowing the ship's cargo' in navigable waters is a 'maritime
service,' and that claims for injury incident thereto are exclusively within admiralty juris-
diction." Id. at 352-53, 121 P.2d at 366.
30. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
31. It is interesting that Justice Black wrote the majority opinions in both Parker and
Davis.
32. "It must be remembered that under the Jensen hypothesis, basic conditions are
factual: Does the state law 'interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity' of maritime
law? Yet, employees are asked to determine with certainty before bringing their actions that
factual question over which courts regularly divide among themselves and within their own
membership." 317 U.S. at 254 (emphasis deleted).
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can be cited both in behalf of and in opposition to recovery here."ssa The pen-
alty for a wrong decision on the part of the claimant was not only serious finan-
cial loss through the delay and the expense of litigation, but in many cases the
claim was barred by the statute of limitation in the proper forum "while he
was erroneously pursuing it elsewhere. ' 34 This was obviously not the purpose
of the federal act.
The solution, the court decided, did not lie in the repeal of the Jensen line
of decisions. Too much was already predicated on Jensen3 r and overruling it
would only bring about further confusion.3" The Court reasoned that the basic
problem, in the light of Jensen and Rohde, was that claimants and employers
in certain 'grey' areas of possibly concurrent jurisdiction had to decide questions
of law long before a competent court could rule on them. These people were
in the famous "twilight zone." 37 Air. Justice Black then enunciated the new
policy of the Court: "[f] aced with this factual problem we must give great-
indeed, presumptive-weight to the conclusions of the appropriate federal au-
thorities and to the state statutes themselves." 38 Under this theory fact findings
of the agency, if supported by evidence, would be final. They would be over-
ruled only if clearly erroneous. Thus, when a state agency made the deter-
rmination, in cases of uncertain jurisdiction, i.e., within the "twilight zone," that
state law could validly be applied, this would be treated as a conclusive finding
of fact. Prior to Davis, these same facts would have required a determination
of constitutionality as a matter of law. Davis, however, created several problems.
First, what was the extent of the "twilight zone"? Second, could there possibly
be concurrent coverage under the federal and state acts?30
Shortly after Davis, in two per curiam decisions, the Supreme Court indicated
33. Id. at 253 (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 254. The employer, likewise, faced confusion as to the type of insurance he
should carry, and the penalty for a wrong guess could be substantial additional payments
and, under the federal law, 33 US.C. §§ 938, 932, the employer was subject to a fine and
imprisonment for the misdemeanor of having failed to properly insure under the federal act.
Id. at 255.
35. See 317 US. at 259 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
36. The Court noted that petitioner had not asked that the Jensen case be overruled and
that much had been accomplished by state and federal agencies to close the gap between
Jensen and state compensation. Id. at 255.
37. "There is, in the light of the cases referred to, clearly a twilight zone in which ...
particular facts and circumstances are vital elements." Id. at 256.
38. Id.
39. Both Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion and Chief Justice Stone in his
dissent assumed that the Court had created an area of overlapping jurisdiction where,
presumably, recovery could validly be had under either federal or state law. "Theoretic
illogic is inevitable so long as the employee in a situation like the present is permitted to
recover either under the federal act ... or under a state statute." 317 US. at 259 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (citations omitted). "Congress . . . has left no room for an over-
lapping dual system of the sort which the Court now espouses by placing its decision on a
new doctrine that recovery under either the state or the federal act is to be sustained if
the case is thought a close one." Id. at 261 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
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that the scope of the "twilight zone" was to be somewhat larger than that
previously encompassed by the "maritime but local" doctrine, in Moores'
Case,40 a state board awarded compensation to a shipyard worker injured while
repairing a completed ship on navigable waters. Recognizing that injuries sus-
tained while working on a completed ship were traditionally within exclusive
federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, relying heavily on
Davis, nevertheless sustained the state award.41 The Supreme Court affirmed
per curiam, citing Davis.42 In Baskin v. Industrial Accident ConrMission4a the
Supreme Court reversed, citing Moores' Case, a California decision denying
recovery under the state compensation statute on facts identical with those of
the Massachusetts case. 44
The result of the Supreme Court's summary treatment of these two cases led
inevitably to more confusion. Some courts used the "twilight zone" to extend
state jurisdiction into areas heretofore exclusively federal. 4 5 One court went so
far as to hold that state and federal jurisdiction were completely concurrent. 40
Other courts refused to apply the doctrine at all and held that the federal act
was the exclusive remedy when the injury occurred on navigable waters.47
40. 323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478, aff'd per curiam sub nom. Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948).
41. A cogent insight into the confused state of the law at this time is evident In the
following excerpt from the Massachusetts opinion: "Epirobably therefore our proper course
is not to attempt to reason the matter through and to reconcile previous authorities, or to
preserve fine lines of distinction, but rather simply to recognize the futility of attempting
to reason logically about 'illogic,' and to treat the Davis case as intended to be a revolu-
tionary decision deemed necessary to escape an intolerable situation and as designed to
include within a wide circle of doubt all waterfront cases involving aspects pertaining both
to the land and to the sea where a reasonable argument can be made either way, even
though a careful examination of numerous previous decisions might disclose an apparent
weight of authority one way or the other." 323 Mass. at 167, 80 N.E.2d at 481.
42. 335 U.S. 874 (1948).
43. 89 Cal. App. 2d 632, 201 P.2d 549, vacated per curiam, 338 U.S. 854 (1949).
44. The California court had taken the exact opposite position from that of the Massa-
chusetts court and held that Baskin could not be within the twilight zone because prior
precedent was clear that an accident of this nature was within exclusive federal jurisdiction.
89 Cal. App. 2d at 638, 201 P.2d at 552-53.
45. Sullivan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 So. 2d 834 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (longshoreman
injured while working on a vessel in navigable waters); Allisot v. Federal Shipbuilding &
Drydock Co., 4 N.J. 445, 73 A.2d 153 (1950) (worker injured while performing extensive
repairs to a vessel lying in navigable waters) ; De Graw v. Todd Shipyards Co., 134 N.J.L.
315, 47 A.2d 338 (Ct. Err. & App.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 759 (1946) (pipefitter Injured
while working on completed ship lying in navigable waters); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.
America v. Marshall, 308 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) (pipefitter injured while work-
ing on a completed vessel lying in a floating dry dock); Commissioner v. Oceanic Serv.
Corp., 276 App. Div. 725, 97 N.Y.S.2d 401 (3d Dep't 1950) (night watchman who ap-
parently fell from ship moored in the North River).
46. Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 95 So. 2d 830 (La. Ct. App. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 952 (1958) (longshoreman injured in the course of his employment while
working in the hold of a ship lying in navigable waters allowed to recover under state act).
47. In Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 276 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1960), the facts
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The Fifth Circuit's dislike of the "twilight zone" concept 48 led the Supreme
Court to speak again on the troublesome jurisdictional problem. In Calbeck v.
Travelers Ins. Co.,49 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a worker
who was injured while working on a vessel under construction lying in navigable
waters was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state, did not fall within the
"twilight zone," and thus could not elect to recover compensation under state or
federal law.50 The Supreme Court reversed and allowed recovery under the
Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.51 Mr. Justice
Brennan pointed out that the effect of the lower court's ruling would be to
exempt from the Longshoremen Act's coverage "not only the injuries suffered
by employees while engaged in ship construction but also any other injuries-
even though incurred on navigable waters and so within the reach of Congress-
for which a state law could, constitutionally, provide compensation."" This
interpretation was incorrect. "Our conclusion is that Congress invoked its con-
stitutional power so as to provide compensation for all injuries sustained by
employees on navigable waters whether or not a particular injury might also
have been within the constitutional reach of a state workmen's compensation
law."53 Thus Calbeck adopted, at least seaward of the pier, a pure situs test for
recovery under the federal act.5 4
were unclear as to whether decedent fell from a barge or the bank of a river. The court
held that if he fell from the barge the federal act would be his exclusive remedy; if he fell
from the bank, the state act would be his sole remedy. In Noah v. Liberty Mlut. Ins. Co.,
267 F2d 218 (5th Cir. 1959), the court refused to allow state compensation under Louisiana
law for a longshoreman killed while loading cargo on a ship in navigable waters. A prior
Louisiana case, Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedore, Inc., 95 So. 2d 830 (La. Ct. App. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 US. 952 (1958), allowed state recovery under similar facts. In Flowers v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1958), a workman injured while repairing a
completed ship was held to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal act. In
Warner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 332 S.W2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), a workman, who, at
the time of the accident was standing on a scaffold approximately twelve feet above the
water and whose work consisted of peeling down and caulking rivets on the outside of the
hull of a vessel floating in navigable waters, was held to be within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act.
48. See the Fifth Circuit cases dted note 47 supra.
49. 293 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
50. 293 F.2d at 59-60. For a critical discussion of Calbeck before it reached the Supreme
Court see 50 Calif. L. Rev. 342, 345 (1962).
51. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
52. Id. at 117.
53. Id. (footnote omitted). Arguments were made that Calbeck made the "'twilight
zone' extinct." Gainsburgh & Fallon, Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Company: The Twi-
light's Last Gleaming?, 37 Tul. L. Rev. 79, 87 (1962) (footnote omitted).
54. However, Calbeck was not subsequently interpreted as precluding state recovery
seaward of the pier in proper circumstances, i.e., in the "twilight zone." In Michigan Mut.
Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965), the court,
holding that an injury which occurred on a skid which protruded from the wharf over
navigable waters was compensable under the federal statute, quoted Calbeck, stating: "'We
do not question that the skid on which Parisi was injured was sufficiently connected with
the land to sustain an award under the State Compensation Act. But to concede this does
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Certain broad dicta in Calbeck provided the foundation for Nacirema. In
discussing what jurisdiction Congress intended to exercise when it originally
passed the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
the Supreme Court quoted with approval the opinion in De Bardeleben Coal
Corp. v. Henderson:55 "[C] ongress intended to exercise to the fullest extent all
the power and jurisdiction it had over the subject-matter.... Congress intended
the compensation act to have a coverage co-extensive with the limits of its
authority . . . ."6 By this language the Supreme Court arguably implied that
the Longshoremen's Act was status-oriented, rather than situs-oriented. If
jurisdiction was intended to be status-oriented, then the Longshoremen's Act
could logically be extended to cover injuries sustained by longshoremen on
the pier while engaged in maritime activities. The status of the injured rather
than the situs of the injury would be controlling. This was precisely the con-
clusion the Fourth Circuit came to in Marine Stevedoring.57 In a thorough
opinion, Judge Sobeloff explored the legislative history of the act and its subse-
quent judicial development. After first noting that Congress certainly could
have "grounded jurisdiction on the function or status of the employees ... and
thus extend coverage to all longshoremen . . . regardless of the situs of the
injury," the question was whether Congress fully exercised this power or
whether it intended by the phrase "upon the navigable waters" to "freeze
coverage to injuries occurring within the admiralty tort jurisdiction as it was
thought to exist in 1927 . *.. ,28 Relying heavily on the dicta in Calbeck, the
Court concluded that: "Congress designed the Act to be status-oriented, reach-
ing all injuries sustained by longshoremen in the course of their employment." 5 0
In reversing the Fourth Circuit,60 Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority,
in Nacirema, first noted that prior to the Longshoremen's Act it had been
settled law that wharves, piers, and docks were extensions of the land and not
not mean that a federal remedy is precluded; the Longshoremen's Act was intended to
provide compensation for all injuries occurring upon navigable waters 'whether or not a
particular injury might also have been within the constitutional reach of a state workmen's
compensation law.'" Id. at 645 (citation omitted).
55. 142 F.2d 481, 483-84 (5th Cir. 1944).
56. 370 U.S. at 130.
57. Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom.
Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
58. 398 F.2d at 904. This is the same observation Justice Black made twenty-seven years
earlier in Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1941).
59. Id. (footnote omitted). Chief Judge Haynsworth and Judge Boreman dissented from
the majority opinion. It was clear to the dissent that the intent of Congress was to provide
coverage in an area that was heretofore excluded from any compensation remedy. The
Calbeck decision did not reach the issue of pierside injuries and there was nothing In
Calbeck to suggest that the Act should include such injuries. Finally, Judge Haynsworth
argued that the status theory of the majority would open the door to litigation by maritime
workers injured away from the pier. This was clearly not within the intention of Congress
in 1927 when they passed the federal act. Id. at 909-14.
60. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
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within traditional admiralty jurisdiction.6' He pointed out that the phrase in
the statute, "upon the navigable waters" if read literally, would not include
injuries on the pier. However, even though the Longshoremen's Act "employs
language which determines coverage by the 'situs' of the injury,"' 2 respondents
urged that it should be interpreted to cover the "status" of the employee. In
rejecting this argument the Court reasoned that the legislative and judicial
history of the Longshoremen's Act clearly pointed to a narrower construction.6
3
The Longshoremen's Act was passed after two attempts by Congress to extend
state coverage seaward were declared unconstitutional.G4 As originally drafted
the bill extended coverage to injuries "on a place within the admiralty juris-
diction of the United States, except employment of local concern and no direct
relation to navigation or commerce."0 r5 During the hearings on the proposed bill,
the majority pointed out, it was repeatedly assumed that docks and piers were
not within the admiralty jurisdiction. "In fact, a representative of the Labor
Department objected to the bill precisely for that reason, urging the Committee
to extend coverage to cover the contract 'and not the man simply when he is on
the ship.',6 6 justice White argued that if Congress had intended to adopt that
suggestion, "it could not have chosen a more inappropriate way of expressing
its intent than by substituting the words 'upon the navigable waters' for the
words 'within the admiralty jurisdiction.' 7
The court then turned to subsequent judicial interpretations of the statute.
Conceding that since Jensen there had been cases allowing recovery under state
laws in particular situations seaward of the pier, Mr. Justice White went on to
say that this "is a far cry from construing the Act to reach injuries on land
traditionally within the ambit of state compensation acts."0 8 The Calbeck case,
on which the lower court relied so heavily, merely made it clear that Congress
intended to exercise its full jurisdiction seaward of the Jenscn line. It was not
concerned with, nor did it mention, pierside injuries. "Indeed," the court argued,
"Calbeck freely cited the Parker and Davis declarations that the Longshore-
men's Act adopted the Jensen line, and Calbeck's holding rejected the notion
61. Justice White cited several cases as well as two well-known hornbooks for this
proposition. 396 US. at 215 n-5.
62. Id. at 215.
63. "Congress might have extended coverage to all longshoremen by exercising its power
over maritime contracts. But the language of the Act is to the contrary and the background
of the statute leaves little doubt that Congress' concern in providing compensation was a
narrower one." Id. at 215-16 (footnote omitted).
64. See note 9 supra.
65. Hearings on S. 3170 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1926).
66. 396 US. at 217-18 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. (footnote omitted). The court felt that, indeed, this suggestion was explicitly
rejected rather than adopted. It quoted the Senate report which accompanied the revised
bill. "'[Injuries occurring in loading or unloading are not covered unless they occur on the
ship or between the wharf and the ship so as to bring them within the maritime jurisdiction
of the United States."' Id. at 218-19.
68. Id. at 221.
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that the line should advance or recede simply because decisions of this Court
had permitted state remedies in narrow areas seaward of that line. Otherwise,
the reach of the federal act would be subject to uncertainty, and its coverage
would 'expand and recede in harness with developments in constitutional inter-
pretation as to the scope of state power to compensate injuries on navigable
waters' . . . . As in Calbeck, we refuse to impute to Congress the intent of
burdening the administration of compensation by perpetuating such confu-
sion."6 9
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the Admiralty Extension Act7"
extended the jurisdiction of the Longshoremen's Act.71 Justice White pointed
out that the Extension Act was passed to remedy the completely different situ-
ation where "parties aggrieved by injuries done by ships to bridges, docks, and
the like could not get into admiralty at all."7 2 Also, the legislative history of the
Extension Act was completely devoid "of any reference to the Longshoremen's
Act, as might well be expected in an act dealing with a wholly unrelated prob-
lem."73
In summation, the court stated the practical consideration involved in its
narrow construction of the Act: "and construing the Longshoremen's Act to
coincide with the limits of admiralty jurisdiction-whatever they may be and
however they may change-simply replaces one line with another whose uncer-
tain contours can only perpetuate on the landward side of the Jensen line, the
same confusion which previously existed on the seaward side." 74
Mr. Justice Douglas, Black and Brennan dissented for the reasons stated in
the Court of Appeals by Judge Sobeloff that the Longshoremen's Act jurisdic-
tion after Calbeck was status and not situs-oriented. 7 They also pointed out the
incongruity that in one of the cases being reviewed, the Court of Appeals
affirmed federal recovery since the deceased, after being struck by a cable on the
pier, fell into the water where he died.
It could be argued that Nacirema will have little effect on the controversy
69. Id. (citation omitted).
70. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964). The Act, in pertinent part, states: "The admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage
or injury, or person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding
that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land."
71. Some lower courts had used the Extension Act as justification for extending federal
jurisdiction. See Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965); Interlake S.S. Co. v.
Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964); Puget Sound Bridge & Dry Dock Co. v. O'Leary,
260 F. Supp. 260 (W.D. Wash. 1966).
72. 396 U.S. at 222 (footnote omitted). This was a result of the Supreme Court's ruling
in The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866), that sparks from a burning ship that set a
wharf afire was not within the tort jurisdiction of admiralty and a suit in rem may not be
brought against the vessel.
73. 396 U.S. at 222 n.18.
74. 396 U.S. at 223.
75. It may be useful in anticipating future decisions in this still unsettled field to note
that Mr. Justice Brennan joined the dissent in the principal case on the basis of the Calbeck
case in which he wrote the majority opinion.
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that has raged seaward of the pier since Jensen in 1917 and has produced such
anomalies as the "twilight zone" and the "maritime but local" doctrine. Read
narrowly on its facts the case may in the future be held to apply only to injuries
occurring landward of the Jensen line. It could also be argued that Nacirema,
through its interpretation of Calbeck, has adopted a strict situs test on either
side of the pier.78 If this approach is accepted it will significantly alleviate the
uncertainty and doubt that has for too long surrounded this area.
However, in view of the tortured history of section 903 (a) of the Longshore-
men's Act, perhaps the most succinct assessment of the problem was made by
Judge Brown, writing for the Fifth Circuit, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cal-
beck: "We know by now that nothing written in this field is the last word. All
it can be is 'the latest word.' ,,77
Constitutional Law-Abortion---California Statute Held Unconstitutional.
-Petitioner, a physician, gave an unmarried woman the telephone number of a
Los Angeles abortionist who subsequently performed an abortion on the woman.
Petitioner contended that he had done this to save the woman's life, since she
had threatened to go to Tijuana for an abortion, an act which the petitioner
felt might result in her death. When the police raided the abortionist's apart-
ment, they discovered two notebooks containing names of abortees, fourteen of
which were followed by notations indicating that they had been referred by the
petitioner. The discovery of the notebooks led to petitioner's arrest, trial and
conviction for "procur[ing] the miscarriage of [a] . . . woman" without its
being "necessary to preserve her life."' The conviction was affirmed by the
California Court of Appeal.2 The California Supreme Court reversed and,
over a strong dissent, held the above statute to be invalid both because the
words "necessary to preserve" were too vague to satisfy constitutional standards
of clarity in criminal statutes, and because the statute interfered with the
woman's right to life under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
76. Thus an injured man would know immediately where his remedy lay based upon
the situs of his injury. Of course there will still be some inconsistencies as, for example, the
Longshoreman who was injured on the pier but was allowed federal recovery because he
fell in navigable waters.
The argument that employers will be forced to pay double premiums is largely illusory in
that most states allow employers to self insure. See 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation § 92.10, at 444 (1968). Also there is a standard nationwide compensation
policy which may be extended to cover the Longshoremen's Act. Employer's premiums are
divided between the amount of the employer's operation that fall under the Federal and
State Act. This avoids duplication of premiums. See eg., Rate Adjustment Endorsement
Form Y-383, Marine Office of America; see Note, Injured Maritime Worker's and the
"twilight zone," 50 Calif. L. Rev. 342, 347 (1962).
77. 293 F.2d 52, 60 (5th Cir. 1961).
1. Cal. Penal Code § 274 (West 1955).
2. 276 Cal. App. 2d 329 (1969).
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and with her right to privacy under the first amendment. People v. Belous, 71
Cal. 2d 996, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
Abortion is defined, medically, as "the premature delivery or expulsion of a
human fetus before it is capable of sustaining life." The legal definition of
abortion is "the wilful bringing about of the miscarriage of a woman without
justification or excuse." 4 Abortion has been known and practiced to varying
degrees in nearly every culture since ancient times;6 today, it is a crime in all
fifty states." However, forty-six states exclude from their criminal sanctions
abortions necessary to preserve the life of the woman.7 The Belous opinion, and
the more recent case of United States v. Vuitch,8 are the first decisions to suc-
cessfully challenge the validity of these acts.
The Belous opinion initially set forth the standards applicable in determining
the constitutionality of a criminal statute and noted that the degree of clarity
required for a penal statute is higher than that required for a civil law: 9
The requirement of a reasonable degree of certainty in legislation, especially in the
criminal law, is a well established element of the guarantee of due process of law.
"No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State corn-
3. S. Kling, Sexual Behavior and the Law 1 (1969).
4. R. Perkins, Criminal Law 140 (2d ed. 1969) (footnote omitted).
5. S. Kling, supra note 3, at 1. See also Devereux, A Typological Study of Abortion In
350 Primitive, Ancient and Pre-Industrial Societies, in Abortion in America 97-152 (H.
Rosen ed. 1967). At common law abortion was not an offense unless the woman was "quick
with childe." If the child was delivered alive, and lived, even if for only a few minutes,
before succumbing, the abortional act was punished as murder. R. Perkins, supra note 4,
at 140.
6. For the present situation in Washington, D.C., see United States v. Vuitch, 305 F.
Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
7. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration
of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. Rev. 730, 731-35. The abortion statutes fall into
three main types: those states which do not provide for any "unjustified" abortions; those
which permit it if "necessary to preserve the life [or health] of the mother;" and those
which are based on the more liberal American Law Institute model abortion law-The
Model Abortion Act-which reads as follows:
(2) Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justified in terminating a pregnancy If:
(a) be believes there is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely
impair the physical or mental health of the mother or that the child would be born with
grave physical or mental defect, or the pregnancy resulted from rape by force or its
equivalent as defined in Section 207.4(1) or from incest as defined in Section 207.3; and
(b) two physicians, one of whom may be the person performing the abortion, have
certified in writing their belief in the justifying circumstances, and have filed such certificate
prior to the abortion in the licensed hospital where it was to be performed, or In such
other place as may be designated by law.
Model Penal Code § 207.11(2)(a)-(b). For a conclusive listing of the abortion statutes
and relevant discussion, see Lucas, supra, 733-35 and notes accompanying.
8. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969). But see State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 191, 244
A.2d 499, 504, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968).




mands or forbids .... [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."'10
In Belous, the court utilized two methods of discovering the meaning of the
key phrase "necessary to preserve the life of the woman:" first, scrutiny of the
words "necessary" and "preserve" independently of the phrase in which they
were found in the statute and, secondly, examination of case law. The court
admitted, however, that it was not searching for "mathematical certainty,"11
but "reasonable certainty," recognizing that "some matter of degree" is in-
volved in the interpretation of all penal statutes."-
After some effort,13 the Betous majority decided that the meaning of the
word "necessary" was unclear: "The courts have recognized that "'necessary'
has not a fixed meaning, but is flexible and relative. 14 An examination of
"preserve," based on Webster's New International Dictionary, proved equally
unclear.15 The word "preserve" could be interpreted as either merely keeping the
woman's health from deteriorating, or as keeping the woman alive, in the most
minimal sense of that word.' The same phraseology was criticized in the only
other decision holding an abortion law unconstitutional: United States v.
Vuitch:17
10. 71 Cal. 2d at 1002, 458 P.2d at 197, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 357, citing Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 US. 451, 453 (1939).
11. 71 Cal. 2d at 1003, 458 P.2d at 198, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
12. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
13. The court noted: 'ictionary definitions and judicial interpretations fail to provide a
clear meaning for the words, 'necessary' or 'preserve.' There is, of course, no standard
definition of 'necessary to preserve,' and taking the words separately, no clear meaning
emerges." 71 Cal. 2d at 1003, 458 P.2d at 198, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
14. Id., citing Westphal v. Westphal, 122 Cal. App. 379, 382, 10 P.2d 119, 120 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1932): "The word E'necessary'] must be considered in the connection in which it is
used, as it is a word susceptible of various meanings." See Black's Law Dictionary at 1181
(4th ed. 1968). Webster defines the word as: "1. essential to a desirable or projected end or
condition; not to be dispensed with without loss, damage, inefficiency or the like. . .
Webster's International Dictionary (2d ed. 1959). In addition to scrutinizing the case law
and Webster's Dictionary for the meaning of the disputed phrase, the court searched the
face of the statute for an express definition. Failing to find one, it then considered legislative
intent but found that, although there was historical basis for a restrictive abortion statute,
that view was no longer valid. 71 Cal. 2d at 1007, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
15. Webster defines "preserve" as "1. to keep or save from injury or destruction; to guard
or defend from evil; to protect; save. 2. To keep in existence or intact ... To save from
decomposition .... 3. To maintain; to keep up . . ." Webster's International Dictionary
(2d ed. 1959) at 1794.
16. 71 Cal. 2d at 1003, 458 P.2d at 198, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358. Roy Lucas, author of the
model abortion brief designed to test the abortion law of any state, asks the question:
"Does it mean that without an abortion a woman has to die immediately, or that she
will have her life span shortened by two days?" Greenhouse Constitutional Question: Is
There a Right to Abortion?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 31, col. 2.
17. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
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The jury's acceptance or nonacceptance of an individual doctor's interpretation of the
ambivalent and uncertain word 'health' should not determine whether he stands con-
victed of a felony, facing ten years imprisonment. His professional judgment made in
good faith should not be challenged. There is no clear standard to guide either the
doctor, the jury or the Court....
Thus the phrase under discussion will not withstand attack for it fails to give that
certainty which due process of law considers essential in a criminal statute. Its many
ambiguities are particularly subject to criticism for the statute unquestionably im-
pinges to an appreciable extent on significant constitutional rights of individuals.1 s
Failing to find an adequate basis for decision from an independent study of
the words themselves, the Belous court then turned to case law for a workable
definition of "necessary to preserve the life of the woman." It first discussed
California's suggested meaning of the words: "If medical science feels the
abortion should be performed as it is necessary to preserve her life, then it may
be performed; that is, unless it is performed the patient will die."' 9 It rejected
this view, interpreting it as requiring "certainty or immediacy of death,' 20 a
definition which California courts had already considered and rejected in People
v. Abarbanel2' and in People v. Ballard.22
The court then considered a second definition, implicitly upheld in People v.
Abarbanel,23 that "necessary to preserve" denoted "a possibility of death differ-
ent from or greater than the ordinary risk of childbirth.12 4 However, if the
"psychological factor"--that aspect of the woman's mental condition which
suggests to the psychiatrists that she might endanger herself if she were not
aborted-is thus "decisive," it could result in abortion virtually on demand.2 5
18. Id. at 1034.
19. 71 Cal. 2d at 1004, 458 P.2d at 198, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
20. Id.
21. 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). Two psychiatrists
found the "possibility of suicide" of a pregnant woman to be so great as to warrant
recommending an abortion for her. Id. at 32, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
22. 218 Cal. App. 2d 295, 32 Cal. Rptr. 233 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). In Ballard, a
pregnant woman came to defendant-doctor and told him that she had been taking nine
to twelve turpentine pills a day and had passed blood and tissue and had severe headaches.
The doctor testified that he, relying on her information, made no examination but told her
that the fetus was dead and that a miscarriage had already begun. He stated that if a
dilation and curettage were not soon performed, hemorrhage could set in and the patient
"might very well die." Id. at 295, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 235. From these two decisions the
Bdelous court concluded that either "ill health or the mere 'possibility' of suicide," not
"immediacy or certainty of death," would constitute necessity to preserve the woman's
life. 71 Cal. 2d at 1005, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359. It is "'enough that the
dangerous condition be potentially present, even though its full development might be
delayed to a greater or less extent.'" Id. at 1005, 458 P.2d at 198-99, 80 Cal. Rptr. at
358-59, citing People v. Abarbanel, 239 Cal. App. 2d at 34, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
23. 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 364.
24. 71 Cal. 2d at 1012, 458 P.2d at 204, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
25. Id. See also R. Perkins, supra note 4, at 147: "[Tjhe fact that a woman has
threatened to commit suicide unless relieved of her unborn child does not establish that the
miscarriage was necessary to save her life. The need for such a holding is obvious. Under
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This construction of the statute had to be rejected by the California court since
it would mean that the legislature had intended to pass a "virtually meaning-
less" statute.
26
A third definition, that the statute meant "substantially or reasonably"
necessary to preserve the mother's life, was considered and rejected as not being
"sufficiently precise."2 7 The court added, however, that, Nith respect to other
statutes, the addition of the words "substantially or reasonably" to "necessary"
may have the effect of rendering such statutes sufficiently clear so that their
constitutionality may be sustained, but: "[I] n the instant situation the implica-
tion of such words would merely increase the uncertainty."28
The court's fourth possible interpretation of the words "necessary to preserve
the life of the woman" was that abortion would be legal "when the risk of death
[of the woman] due to the abortion was less than the risk of death in child-
birth."2 9 This has been named the "relative safety" test. 30 Although the court
believed this to have been the test which probably best reflected the California
legislature's intent, it still rejected it because the relative safety test was not
incorporated specifically into the statute, nor could it reasonably be implied
in the words "unless the same is necessary to preserve her life." 3' It is not a
meaning of the phrase at which reasonable "men of 'common' intelligence"
could have arrived3 2
An additional problem created by the statute's vagueness was that the doctor
-an individual with a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" in the
matter-was delegated the duty to determine whether or not to perform the
abortion. 33 Such a "delegation of decision-making power to a directly involved
individual" was said to violate the fourteenth amendment. 4 In addition, the
any other rule a woman could always make such a threat,-which would be a boon to the
'quack' and an embarrassment to the ethical practitioner." (Footnote omitted). Most
authorities seem to agree that a suicide threat by a pregnant woman is very rarely carried
out, at least not for reasons related to the pregnancy.
26. 71 Cal. 2d at 1012, 458 P.2d at 204, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1013, 458 P.2d at 204, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1013-14, 458 P.2d at 204-05, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65.
32. Id. at 1014, 458 P.2d at 205, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
33. Id. at 1015, 458 P.2d at 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 366, citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523 (1927): "[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defen-
dant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property to the
judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest
in reaching a conclusion against him in his case." It may be, however, that since the
petitioner also received money as a "professional courtesy" for abortions performed on his
recommendations that this served to counterbalance his interest in not risking legal retribu-
tion by performing an abortion.
34. 71 Cal. 2d at 1015, 458 P.2d at 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 366. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510, 523 (1927). Because of the doctor's interest in her not having an abortion, the
court noted that some women whose medical condition actually indicates that an abortion
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statute also imposed "enormous" pressure on the doctor to decide against an
abortion because, if he decided incorrectly to perform such an operation, he
would be liable to prosecution and withdrawal of his license to practice
medicine.3 5
Belous concluded its discussion of the vagueness of the statute by stating that
it would not uphold a construction of the statute so thoroughly rejected by the
California courts36 "unless there was a clear showing of a strong public policy or
legislative intent requiring [such] adoption." 37 Apparently, it could find no
such policy or intent. The district court in Vuitch agreed: 3 8 "[A] woman's
liberty and right of privacy extends to family, marriage and sex matters and
may well include the right to remove an unwanted child at least in early stages
of pregnancy .... [A] sound, informed interest of the state must affirmatively
appear before the state infringes unduly on such rights."3 9
The Belous court, perhaps unnecessarily, 40 then went beyond a mere finding
that the language of the statute was too vague to support a conviction. It de-
cided that the statute could also be violative of "the woman's rights to life and
to choose whether to bear children."41 Both of these rights are said to stem from
the federal and state courts' respect for the right of privacy "in matters related
to marriage, family, and sex."'42 The right to privacy is one of the many
acknowledged constitutional rights which are not enumerated in the Constitu-
tion.43 It has been defined simply as the "right to be let alone" 44 and it is con-
sidered to be "necessary for a civilized society. '46 Furthermore, the court
is necessary would not have been recommended or been given it by their physicians. 71
Cal. 2d at 1015, 458 P.2d at 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
35. 71 Cal. 2d at 1015, 458 P.2d at 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 366. The court cites, as
authority for its proposition that the statute is so vague that doctors can only guess at
its meaning, a study reported in Packer & Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in
Law and Medicine, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 417, 444 (1959) in which eleven hypothetical cases were
distributed to twenty-nine hospitals, twenty-six of which then answered whether they thought
that an abortion was called for. Most of the cases so described were plainly outside the
California statute.
36. See cases cited notes 21-22 supra.
37. 71 Cal. 2d at 1005, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
38. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
39. Id. at 1035 (citation omitted).
40. See text accompanying note 79 infra.
41. 71 Cal. 2d at 1005, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359 (emphasis added). The
woman's right to life is said to be involved because, statistically, a pregnant woman has about
one chance in 3,426 of dying in childbirth. See, id. n.6. The court does not discuss the cause
of death for those who died in childbirth. The emphasis, thus far, has been put by the
courts entirely on the mother's right to bear or not to bear the child. See C. Rice, The
Vanishing Right to Live 35-37 (1969).
42. 71 Cal. 2d at 1006, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
43. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965). See Dixon, The Griswold
Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 Mich. L. Rey.
197, 200-02 (1966). See also 71 Cal. 2d at 1006, 458 P.2d at 199-200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60.
44. Dixon, supra note 43, at 199.
45. Jacob & Jacob, Protection of Privacy, 119 New L.J. 157 (1969). At common law,
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impliedly found a possible violation of a second right of privacy-this one
between a citizen and his Government. 40 This right of privacy emanates from
the first amendment, 47 the ninth amendment,48 and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment,49 and involves undue governmental interference with a
citizen's affairs. 50 However, the chief difficulty, and one which the Belous court
did not attempt to alleviate, despite the ever-expanding right to privacy, is that
"[flew concepts ... are more vague or less amenable to definition and struc-
tured treatment than privacy." 51
In reaching its determination that a right of privacy might be involved, the
California court conceded the state's power to enact laws infringing on the
individual's rights if his rights as an individual are superseded by the state's
"compelling interest in the regulation of a subject which is within the police
little remedy could be had for its intrusion by private persons except in rare instances.
Eventually, a limited remedy for invasion of privacy found a place in tort law. W.
Prosser, Torts § 112, at 829-51 (3d ed. 1964). See Dixon, supra note 43, at 199-200.
46. Dixon, supra note 43, at 200-02.
47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). An interesting convergence of
the Griswold-Belous holdings will occur with the "morning after pill," soon to be on the
market. This will be sold as a contraceptive but will have abortive effects. See Joseph P.
Kennedy Jr. Foundation, The Terrible Choice: The Abortion Dilemma 65, 71 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as The Terrible Choice]. See also R. Shaw, Abortion on Trial 82-83
(1968).
48. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring); Id. at 502 (White, J., concurring). The pro-
tection of this fundamental personal right is also said to be the policy lying behind the
third, fourth and fifth amendments. Dixon, supra note 43, at 200.
50. Lucas, supra note 7, at 738.
51. Dixon, supra note 43, at 199. This is illustrated by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), a decision in which the majority required four separate opinions, each of
which acknowledged a right to privacy but based upon a different test of constitutionality,
so as to arrive at the same conclusion: that a Connecticut law forbidding the dispensing
of birth control information was, as applied to married couples, an unconstitutional invasion
of their right to marital privacy. The Justices noted that an actual enforcement of the
long ignored law would require a search of marital bedrooms and a questioning of married
couples about the details of their marital relationship, both of which courses would be
outrageously violative of the husband's and wife's right to privacy.
In further support of its holding, the Belous court cited Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1
(1967) (Virginia statute forbidding interracial marriage is unconstitutional); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 US. 535 (1942) (state's involuntary sterilization of
criminal is unconstitutional) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (law forbidding
parents to send children to private or religious schools is unconstitutional); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (law stating that no foreign language could be taught in
school is unconstitutional) ; Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) (California
statute forbidding miscegenation is unconstitutional. "If the miscegenation law ... is directed
at a social evil and employs a reasonable means to prevent that evil, it is valid regardless of
its incidental effect upon the conduct of particular religious groups." The law is unconstitu-
tional only if it is "discriminatory and irrational." Id. at 713, 198 P.2d at 18).
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powers of the state."5a2 However, such legislation which does necessarily infringe
on the personal rights of an individual must be "narrowly drawn.153 In deciding
whether to retain such a statute, the court must find that the state has a "com-
pelling interest" in the regulation5 4 of abortion and must also find that, though
such a law might be said to intrude upon a constitutionally protected area, it
is drawn with sufficient restraint and is not of "unlimited and indiscriminate
sweep." 5  In Belous, the court found no compelling interest because 1) the
statutes and cases which recognize property and tort rights in unborn children
require that the child eventually be born alive, 0 2) the law differentiates be-
tween the killing of an unborn child, which is murder, and the killing of an
unborn child, which is abortion, a "lesser offense,'5 and 3) the abortion laws
in every state have constantly been aware of a legal exception to the criminality
of abortion, i.e., where the doctor has sacrificed the child to save the mother's
life.5s The state, therefore, "has always recognized that the pregnant woman's
52. 71 Cal. 2d at 1006, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360. That the state has a
"compelling interest" in the lives of its citizens would not seem to be in doubt. See also
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944). Some contend, however, that this
is no longer the case because of the "population explosion."
53. 71 Cal. 2d at 1007, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
54. Id. One interpretation of the state's "compelling interest" in regulating abortion
would be its interest in the health of the mother, as shown by the fact that the D.C.
statute and Vuitch emphasize that it must be a doctor who interprets the abortion law.
The doctor in Vuitch was acquitted but the nurse was convicted. The presumption of good
faith applies only to a doctor. For a second interpretation of the state's "compelling interest"
in the regulation of abortion-its interest in the life of the child-see note 51 supra.
55. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960).
56. 71 Cal. 2d at 1010, 458 P.2d at 202, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 362. The reason for this
requirement is not that the law does not recognize the "child en ventre sa mere" as a human
with legal rights, but is founded upon the difficulties of assessing damages and proving
causation. There are many causes of action which do not survive the death of the
plaintiff, but this does not mean that the tort did not occur or that the legal right did
not exist in the beginning. See D. Louisell, Abortion, The Process of Medicine and the Due
Process of Law 233, 242 n. (1969). See also C. Rice, supra note 40, at 33. Property rights:
See Thurmond v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 836, 427 P.2d 985, 59 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1967) ;
Metzger v. People, 98 Colo. 133, 53 P.2d 1189 (1936); Tort Rights: Cooper v. Blanck,
39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550
(1951); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). Several cases have
arisen lately which refuse to find a cause of action for "wrongful life." See, e.g., Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). See
also Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 30-31, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967): "[Tlhe right of
[the] child to live is greater than and precludes [the] right [of the parents] not to endure
emotional and financial injury." The fact that the fetus is said to have a right to live
leads to the suggestion that he might also be entitled, like other minors, to due process to
protect that right. See The Terrible Choice at 99. With respect to the rights of juveniles,
see Note, 19 Hastings L.J. 223 (1967).
57. It is, however, usually placed under the heading of "homicide." See The Terrible
Choice at 94.
58. "'Lawful justification is used in the sense of necessity. It is a defense that the
destruction of the child's life was necessary to save that of the mother, but it should be
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right to life takes precedence over any interest the state may have in the
unborn." 59 It is clear that the state could not require a woman to sacrifice her
life for the child's, nor, concluded the court, may it require that a woman
undergo the degree of risk in which death in childbirth would be, not absolutely
certain, but even "substantially certain." 0°
The Belous decision is open to severe criticism. The majority seems to have
ignored a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation: "[W]here the words
assailed, taken in connection with the context, are commonly understood, their
use does not render a statute invalid."' For over a hundred years the California
abortion law has been in existence "without evoking a single whimpering cry
against it." 62 The dissent found that the "mandate of the section is plain and
clear" and stated that "the average man in the street, confronted with this law,
would have little trouble in extracting its sense (we hold him accountable to
much more complicated enactments); and the doctor, with his professional
training and expertise would have even less."Ga "'[T] he Constitution does not
require impossible standards'; all that is required is that the language 'conveys
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices .... ,,64
The Belous court also failed to recognize that the right to privacy, like other
first amendment rights, while an important one, is not absolute( 5 The state
often is permitted to intervene in "matters related to marriage, family, and
sex." 66 For example, although parents do have the right to choose their child's
remembered that necessity of this class must be strictly limited. The right can Pnly be
exercised in extremity.'" State v. Brandenburg, 137 N.J.L. 124, 126, 58 A.2d 709, 710 (1948).
Actually, the choice between mother and child almost never arises in twentieth century
medicine, as the medical indications for abortion are considered to be virtually nonexistent.
H. Rosen, supra note 5, at 302. See also R. Shaw, supra note 47, at 71.
59. 71 Cal. 2d at 1011, 458 P.2d at 203, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
60. Id. at 1012, 458 P.2d at 203, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
61. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 552 at 951 (1964) (footnote omitted). See
Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co.
v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922). See also McLean v. Arkansas, 211 US. 539, 54748 (1909)
(If state law has reasonable relationship to protection of public health, safety, and welfare,
a court may not set it aside because it thinks law is unwise) ; Jordan v. De George, 341
U.S. 223 (1951) ("It is significant that the phrase ['crime involving moral turpitude'] has
been part of the immigration laws for more than sixty years. . . . [and] has also been
used for many years as a criterion in a variety of other statutes."). Id. at 229-30.
62. 71 Cal. 2d at 1023, 458 P.2d at 211, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 371 (dissenting opinion).
63. Id. See Westphal v. Westphal, 122 Cal. App. 379, 382, 10 P2d 119, 120 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1932).
64. 71 Cal. 2d at 1021, 458 P.2d at 209, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 369, citing United States v.
Petrillo, 332 US. 1, 7-8 (1947).
65. "'[Tlhe family... is not beyond regulation . . . and it would be an absurdity to
suggest . . . that the home can be made a sanctuary for crime. The right of privacy most
manifestly is not an absolute.'" Poe v. Ullman, 367 US. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing).
66. 71 Cal. 2d at 1006, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
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school, they may not choose whether or not to send him to school. 7 The state
permits a further interference with the delicate parent-child relationship when
it authorizes the child to sue its parents for tortious acts.0 8 In the child abuse
statutes, the state recognizes that the parents do not own the child; he is not
theirs to kill or to beat.0 9 In ruling that a statute forbidding minor children to
distribute religious literature at the bidding of their church and parents was
constitutional, Prince v. Massachusetts70 stated that "neither rights of religion
nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general
interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the
parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the
child's labor and in many other ways." 71 Prince also stated that the power of
the state to protect the child is not lessened merely because the parent couches
his complaint in terms of a valid first amendment right. Thus, a parent may be
forced to allow his child to be vaccinated,7 2 and is obliged by law to call for
medical assistance when his child requires it.73 "The right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to com-
municable disease or the latter to ill health or death. . . . [Tihe state has a
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child's welfare; and . . . this includes, to some extent, matters of
conscience and religious conviction." 74 Thus, the state has a "compelling inter-
est" in the child and may protect it from its parents even though this may
involve an invasion of the parent's constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Furthermore, the right to privacy may not even have been involved in Belous.
Every case cited by the California court to support its view of a right to privacy
was actually based on only "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms," i.e.,
marital sex.75 The state has never extended its protection to extramarital sex
acts and, in fact, has punished them with penal statutes, forbidding adultery
and sodomy.70 The Supreme Court in Griswold77 accepted the constitutionality
of such statutes.78 Had the California court followed one of the cardinal rules
67. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61
N.E. 730 (1901).
68. See generally Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 Hastings
L.J. 201 (1967); 38 Fordham L. Rev. 138 (1969).
69. See, e.g., D.C. Code Encyd. Ann. § 22-901 (1967).
70. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
71. Id. at 166 (footnotes omitted), citing Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231
U.S. 320 (1913); State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901); People v. Ewer, 141
N.Y. 129, 36 N.E. 4 (1894) (N.Y. law forbidding parents to consent to the exhibition of
their under-14 year old daughter as a dancer is constitutional).
72. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
73. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
74. 321 U.S. at 166-67 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
75. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
76. Cal. Penal Code §§ 269 a-b (West 1955) [Adultery]; Cal. Penal Code §§ 286, 287
(West 1955) [Sodomy].
77. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
78. Id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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of statutory interpretation-that the court will limit itself to the narrow facts
of the case and not consider the constitutionality of the statute involved unless
it is an unavoidable part of the relevant issues7-Qit may never have had to
reach the right of privacy issue.
Finally, the Belous decision is wholly out of line with the virtually unanimous
medical and scientific opinion80 that the embryo and the fetus are human life"1
and, as such, are worthy of protection: "[MI]edical authority has recognized
long since that the child is in existence from the moment of conception, and for
many purposes its existence is recognized by the law. The criminal law regards
it as a separate entity, and the law of property considers it in being for all
purposes which are to its benefit, such as taking by ill or descent.. .. [T~he
unborn child in the path of an automobile is as much a person in the street as
the mother ... .,"82 California statutes, as interpreted by the California courts,
have also revealed a recognition of the child as a human being from the moment
of conception.83
The future of abortion statutes is difficult to chart after Belous; it is probable
that the final answer to the question of their constitutionality will come from
the Supreme Court with the Belous and the more recent Tuitchs appeals. 4
Meanwhile, the state legislatures really are left with two choices: they can wait
for their own states' courts to accept or reject Belous or they can revise their
abortion statutes to make the meaning of each phrase more explicit.s8 The
79. See Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 526-27 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80. The union of egg and sperm "initiates the life of a new individual." N. Mietus,
The Therapeutic Abortion Act-A Statement in Opposition 12, citing B. Patten, Foundations
of Embryology 35, 82 (2d ed. 1964). See also Nilsson, Drama of Life Before Birth, Life,
April 30, 1966, at 54.
81. This medical climate has developed the specialty of fetology which has humanized
the fetus so that it may no longer be considered by its mother or by doctor-or by
modem courts-as "a quasi-living thing" with a right to life that is subservient to the
mother's right to privacy and to liberty. See N. Mietus, supra note 80, at 13. See also
_Lxson, Forecasts From the Womb, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1968, at 72; Conniff, The World
of the Unborn, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 41. "[T]he law should
endeavor to keep abreast with the marvelous developments of science and the rapidly-
changing conditions of the world. Precedents are valuable so long as they do not obstruct
justice or destroy progress." Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 637, 92 P.2d 678,
683 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
82. W. Prosser, Torts § 56, at 355 (3d ed. 1964) (footnotes omitted).
83. 71 Cal. 2d at 1020, 458 P.2d at 209, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (dissenting opinion).
84. The court in Vuitch urged that "[a] prompt appeal to the United States Supreme
Court under 18 US.C. § 3731 is highly desirable." 305 F. Supp. at 1036 (D.D.C. 1969).
85. This will be very difficult, however. The laymen in the legislatures will probably be
unable to devise a statute giving a clear medical test which can be applied to every situa-
tion. The language the legislature used originally seemed, until Belous, to have met the
various constitutional standards for clarity. See, e.g., United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S.
1 (1947): "Clearer and more precise language might have been framed . . . [blut none
occurs to us, nor has any better language been suggested, effectively to carry out . . . the
Congressional purpose." Id. at 7. See also United States v. Wurzbach, 280 US. 396, 399
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latter course, however, is the more hazardous since it will not answer the con-
stitutional objection that all abortion statutes-including the therapeutic abor-
tion acts of several states-are per se violative of a woman's right to privacy
and to life and liberty.86
Patents-Licensee Estoppel Doctrine Overruled.-In 1955 Lear, Inc. and
Adkins entered into a licensing agreement under which the former agreed to pay
Adkins royalties on gyroscopes manufactured using an apparatus designed by
Adkins for which a patent was pending, subject to a denial of the patent appli-
cation by the Patent Office or a subsequent holding of invalidity. Subsequently,
Lear refused to continue royalty payments but continued to make use of the
design. After the patent was finally issued in 1960,1 Adkins brought an action
in the California Superior Court for breach of the licensing contract. The court
awarded royalties on one set of gyroscopes, holding the licensee estopped from
challenging the validity of the patent, while finding the remaining gyroscopes
fully anticipated by prior art and, therefore, not subject to royalties.2
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal held that Lear had correctly ter-
(1930); Smith v. Peterson, 131 Cal. App. 2d 241, 246, 280 P.2d 522, 525 (Dist. Ct. App.
1955).
86. For an extensive discussion of other possible arguments for repeal of the abortion
statutes not covered in Belous, see Greenhouse, supra note 16, at 30, 88. Plaintiff's argu-
ments are mainly based on Lucas, supra note 7. The contentions are that 1) the law violates
the right to privacy with respect to the doctor-patient privilege and violates the right of
access to information, freedom of speech, and freedom of association; 2) the law deprives
doctors of the right to practice medicine according to the higest standards of their profession;
3) the law violates the right of the poor to equal protection of the laws since poor women
cannot afford to go to a jurisdiction where they may obtain a legal abortion and cannot
afford to pay for a competent physician to perform an illegal abortion in this jurisdiction.
The result is that a proportionately higher rate of poor-usually black and Puerto
Rican-women die as a result of bungled abortions; 4) the law violates the first amendment
requirement of separation of church and state (based on the traditional opposition of the
Catholic Church to abortion and on the contention that the significance of the fetus as
human person or non-person is a theological and personal opinion, rather than a scientific
fact); 5) the law violates the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.
1. "This long delay has its source in the special character of Patent Office procedures....
[WVhen Adkins made his original application in 1954, it took the average inventor more
than three years before he obtained a final administrative decision on the patentability of
his ideas, with the Patent Office acting on the average application from two to four times."
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 658-59 (1969) (citation omitted).
2. The remaining gyroscopes were found to have been made by a process whose develop-
ment was independent of Adkins' patented invention.
A second and parallel cause of action in tort for wrongful appropriation of a trade secret
was abandoned when the court forced Adkins to choose between the contract and tort
claims. 395 U.S. at 660 & n.9 (The decision of the trial court is unreported).
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minated the royalty payments under contract principles, and that Adkin's only
chance of recovery was an infringement action in the federal courts.3 The
California Supreme Court, on appeal, held that the doctrine of licensee estoppel,
by which a licensee, so long as there is an existing license agreement, is estopped
to deny the validity of his licensor's patent in a suit for royalties under the
agreement, prevented Lear's questioning the validity of the subject patent.4 The
United States Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of licensee estoppel and
remanded to the California Supreme Court to decide the question of patent
invalidity.5 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
Kinsman v. Parkhurst8 is the foundation case of licensee estoppel in the
United States.7 Kinsman held that, while a patent is normally subject to chal-
lenge in a suit involving that patent,8 it cannot be so challenged when the
relationship of the parties to the suit is that of assignor-assignee or, by impli-
cation, licensor-licensee. Courts employed various devices to justify the doc-
trine, such as analogies to a landlord-tenant estoppel9 and later an estoppel by
deed.' 0 But the most widely accepted rationale for the doctrine %was the under-
lying contractual concepts of fairness and justice. While an attack on the
validity of a patent is based on a lack of mutuality of consideration, the theory
of estoppel is based on a contractual promise, express or implied, not to contest
the validity of the patent. If a licensee enters into a licensing agreement, it was
believed, because of a reluctance to risk a possible infringement suit even
though he may doubt the validity of a patent, part of the bargained-for con-
3. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 795, 151 U.S.P.Q. 119 (Dist. CL App. 1966).
4. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967). Had
the court found, however, that the contract had been validly terminated by Adkins, there
would have been no estoppel.
5. As a collateral issue to an action regarding a licensing agreement, invalidity can be
ruled upon by a state court. Otherwise, it must be litigated in an infringement action in
the federal courts which have exclusive jurisdiction in any civil action arising under any act
of Congress relating to patents. 28 US.C. § 1338 (1964).
6. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1855).
7. Prior authority, however, does appear to exist. Cf. Wilder v. Adams, 29 F. Cas. 1216
(No. 17,647) (C.C.D. Mass. 1846), which, in an action brought for royalties under a license,
denied the defense that an allegedly invalid patent represented consideration.
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1964), as amended, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. IV, 1969).
9. As a tenant is denied the power to dispute the title of his landlord while he remains
on the premises, so a licensee is estopped from disputing the licensor's patent while he
continues to make use of it. Coven v. Bostwick, 39 F. 421, 424 (C.CS.D.N.Y. 1889); White
v. Lee, 14 F. 789, 790-91 (C.C.D. Mass. 1882).
10. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 US. 342, 348-49
(1924); Hall Laboratories, Inc. v. National Aluminate Corp., 224 F.2d 303, 306 n.1 (3d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 US. 932 (1956). "The doctrine of estoppel by deed arose by way
of the solemn assurance presumed to have been given by the grantor to the grantee that
the lands and title which were conveyed were as the grantor represented or warranted them
to be, an assurance on which the grantee was assumed to have relied." Automatic Paper
Mach. Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 147 F.2d 608, 613 (3d Cir.), affd sub nom., Scott Paper
Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 US. 249 (1945).
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sideration should be his promise not to contest.'" It was considered inequitable
to prevent a patentee from manufacturing by holding him to his agreement
with the licensee while defeating a suit by him on the agreement by denying
the validity of the patent.12
The high water mark of licensee estoppel was apparently reached in 1905
when the federal government was estopped from asserting patent invalidity as
a defense in a suit for royalties under a licensing agreement.,a Thirteen years
earlier, however, the Supreme Court, while refusing to enforce as unconscion-
able a licensing agreement which included an agreement not to import, make,
or sell any machines covered by patents not within the scope of the agreement,
questioned whether a defendant in a patent suit could estop himself from deny-
ing the validity of a patent which was wholly void. 14
In 1924 the first breach in the virtually solid wall of estoppel came in West-
inghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Formica Insulation Co.'5 in which
the Supreme Court affirmed the analogous doctrine of assignor estoppel, 10
stating that "this Court will not now lightly disturb a rule well settled by
forty-five years of judicial consideration and conclusion in those courts."' 7 It
admitted evidence of prior art, however, to narrow the patent claims' s rather
than to allow the assignee to rely on the plain meaning of the language in his
claims. 19
11. E.g., Hall Laboratories, Inc. v. National Aluminate Corp., 224 F.2d 303 (3d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Marston v. Swett, 82 N.Y. 526, 533-34 (1880);
Marston v. Swett, 66 N.Y. 206, 212-13 (1876). See also MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec.
& Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 413-15 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
12. Milligan v. Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co., 21 F. 570, 572 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884) (a
decision involving an assignment).
13. United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310 (1905).
14. Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892). The Court, in dictum, quotes
Crane v. French, 38 Miss. 503, 532 (1860): "[w]ith regard to all such matters of public
policy, it would seem that no man can bind himself by estoppel not to assert a right which
the law gives him on reasons of public policy." Id. at 235.
15. 266 U.S. 342 (1924).
16. The Court affirmed assignor estoppel by analogy to an estoppel by deed. See 4 H.
Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 1230 (3d ed. B. Jones 1939); note 10 supra. This
theory has been criticized on the basis that, since estoppel could not be invoked If an un-
authorized grantor conveyed public lands, it could not be invoked if the assigned patent(s)
are invalid. Kramer, Estoppel to Deny Validity-A Slender Reed, 23 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev.
237, 239 (1968).
17. 266 U.S. at 349.
18. The typical patent contains: necessary drawings, an introductory explanation of
the state of the art and the specific innovation thereto, a detailed explanation of the
operation of the invention (specifications) and the claims. The claims are the heart of the
patent since infringement is determined by reading the claims against the offending Item.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-14 (1964), as amended, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Supp. IV, 1969).
19. 266 U.S. at 352-55. The reasoning of Formica has been applied likewise to licensee
cases. E.g., New Wrinkle, Inc. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 277 F.2d 409, 411 (3d Cir. 1960).
One writer in his interpretation of Formica suggests: "Once a court marshals enough
prior art to seriously narrow a patent, it would seem that it has impliedly ruled the patent
[Vol. 3 8
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The doctrine was further eroded by the 1942 Supreme Court decision in
Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co. 20 which permitted the licensee to
contest patent validity when the patentee sought to enjoin his licensee from
avoiding certain price fixing provisions in the licensing agreement since such
provisions would be in violation of the antitrust laws if the patent were in-
valid.21 The Court held that when a state rule of estoppel conflicted with federal
policy, in this case the antitrust laws, the state rule must give way.2 2 Five years
later the Supreme Court rendered similar rulings in two companion cases, Ed-
ward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co.-3 and MacGregor
v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co.,2 4 even though the licensor was
not attempting to enforce the price fixing provisions. Thus, the doctrine no
longer applied where the license agreement merely contained clauses ostensibly
illegal under the antitrust laws. These decisions seemed to follow a public policy
approach set forth in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co. 2 5 which,
while refusing to decide whether the doctrine of estoppel was in conflict with
the antitrust laws, stated that "[i] f a manufacturer or user could restrict him-
self, by express contract, or by any action which would give rise to an 'estoppel,'
from using the invention of an expired patent, he would deprive himself and
the consuming public of the advantage to be derived from his free use of the
disclosures. The public has invested in such free use by the grant of a monopoly
to the patentee for a limited time."28
At this point it would have seemed that the Court was prepared to completely
abrogate the doctrine of licensee estoppel. It had in Katzinger and MacGregor
would be found invalid, but for the estoppel. Any drastic curtailment of the patent's scope
would appear to be nearly as effective as a declaration of invalidity in freeing commerce
from the clog of an unwarranted monopoly." Kramer, supra note 16, at 251. See Casco
Prods. Corp. v. Sinko Tool & Mfg. Co., 116 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 Us.
693 (1941), which held that prior art, employed to prove noninfringement, can be used to
reduce the scope of the claims to zero without overruling estoppel. But even if any drastic
curtailment of the scope of the claims in an application of Formica does effectively in-
validate the patent such a result was unintended by Formica. The Patent Office's function
is to limit the claims to that which is novel and not obvious from prior art. Formica might
be best understood as a continuation of that function in the courts upon the application
of the licensee after the granting of the patent. The Formica court, in stating that prior art
may be used not to invalidate the patent but merely to construe and narrow the claims,
calls the distinction a "nice one but ... workable." 266 U.S. at 351.
20. 317 US. 173 (1942).
21. Id. at 175-77. Thus, if we consider the limited monopoly granted by the patent laws
as an exception to the antitrust laws, price fixing provisions would clearly be illegal if the
patent is held invalid.
22. Id. at 177. This is an application of the supremacy clause of the Constitution under
which the state contractual law of estoppel must falL
23. 329 U.S. 394 (1947).
24. 329 US. 402 (1947).
25. 326 US. 249 (1945).
26. Id. at 255-56. After a patent has expired everyone is free to practice the invention
and no question of estoppel arises. Id. at 254.
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apparently adopted the expansive policy reasoning of Scott rather than kill it
by the slow death of exceptions, such as those for prior expired patents 7 and
price fixing.28 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in fact, believed that the Katzinger and
MacGregor decisions effectively overruled the estoppel doctrine.29 In 1950,
however, the Court in Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc.30 reaffirmed the doctrine of licensee estoppel, merely noting in
passing the then recent exceptions in the area of price fixing provisionsA Al-
though the strong public policy arguments of Scott, Katzinger, and MacGregor,
as well as the earlier language in Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 2 were
not followed in Automatic Radio, one subsequent commentator concluded: "It
is obvious that in any conflict with public policy the doctrine of estoppel will
be the loser .... However, the areas in which this conflict exists are far from
certain. If it is considered that any limitation on the right to challenge the
validity of a patent contravenes public policy ... then the doctrine of estoppel
is obviously a dead issue." 33 The decision that estoppel does indeed contravene
public policy has now been made in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins.
By the Court's own admission it granted certiorari in this case "to reconsider
the validity of the Hazeltine rule in the light of our recent decisions empha-
sizing the strong federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not
merit patent protection.134 The Court in the decisions to which it referred,
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 5 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting
Inc.,36 in language so sweeping that it could be interpreted as sounding the
death knell of all state laws of unfair competition, 7 had held that the copying
27. See note 26 supra.
28. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
29. He charged that the Court ignored the consideration of private good faith, saying:
"If a doctrine that was vital law for more than ninety years will be found to have been
deprived of life, we ought at least to give it decent public burial." 329 U.S. at 416 (Frank-
furter, J., in a joint dissent in Katzinger and MacGregor). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dis-
senting in Scott as well as Katzinger and MacGregor, found it fundamentally incompatible
with fair play to permit one to sell and then use a defense that he has sold nothing. 326
U.S. at 258-59 (dissenting opinion).
30. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
31. Id. at 836.
32. 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
33. Cooper, Estoppel to Challenge Patent Validity: The Case of Private Good Faith vs.
Public Policy, 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 1122, 1153 (1967).
34. 395 U.S. at 656. In a previous decision Mr. Justice White had stated: "The Court
has already held similar agreements contrary to public policy and unenforceable. In the
'patent estoppel' cases, the Court found that public policy favors the exposure of Invalid
patent monopolies before the courts in order to free the public from their effects. Thus a
licensee may not be prevented from attacking the validity of his licensor's patent." United
States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 200 n. (1963) (concurring opinion in which lie
cites Scott and a number of price fixing cases).
35. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
36. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
37. "To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of
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of articles not covered by a federal patent or copyright is an act protected by
federal law against state interference.
Whereas a number of lower court cases have limited Sears and Compco to
their specific facts,38 another line of cases broadly interpreted these decisions
so that any product which could be the subject of a federal patent or copyright
under the Constitution was precluded from state protection. 0 Thus, the patent
clause4° may be interpreted as a grant of exclusive power to Congress pre-
empting all state protection of creative rights whether patented or not 4' or in
such a way that the supremacy clause operates to invalidate the state law only
where such a law is in direct conflict with federal patent legislation.4"' In Lear
the Court was faced with a situation similar to Sears and Compco in which an
article, which may not be worthy of a patent, may nevertheless be protected
an article which represents too slight an advance to be patented would be to permit the
State to block off from the public something which federal law has said belongs to the
public. The result would be that while federal law grants only 14 or 17 years' protection
to genuine inventions . . .States could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking
in novelty to merit any patent at all under federal constitutional standards. This would be
too great an encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated." 376 U.S. at 231-32.
See Van Prods. Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 269-71, 213 A2d
769, 780-81 (1965) (concurring opinion) ; Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Pre-Emption-
The Aftermath of Sears and Compco, 49 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 713, 717-24 (1967); cf. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 US. 1007
(1967); Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 989 (1965). Although Sears and Compco were not without precedent in invoking federal
patent policy to strike down a state law of unfair competition, previous decisions were
based not on federal preemption but on the principle that the subject of an expired patent
was dedicated to the public. See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co, 163 U.S. 169
(1896); Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562 (1893); West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit
Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 840 (1955); Zippo Mfg. Co.
v. Manners Jewelers, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. La. 1960).
38. See, e.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D.
Cal. 1967); Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 247
F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 141
U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 778, 254 N.Y.S.2d
36 (1st Dep't 1964).
39. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315 (Ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 US. 1007 (1967); Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
40. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cd. 8.
41. Contra, Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1878); Livingston v. Van Ingen,
9 Johns. 507, 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jud. 1812).
42. The alternatives have been aptly phrased by one writer: "The extent to which this
preemption theory [as found in Sears and Compco] will effect areas previously regarded
as within the competence of the states may turn in part upon whether the disability is
viewed as imposed by negative implications from the patent clause or by the operation of
the supremacy clause upon situations where state law conflicts with the federal statutory
patent policy." Treece, Patent Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32
U. Chi. L. Rev. 80, 83 (1964). See also Adelman, supra note 37.
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by a state estoppel doctrine. The Court, however, declined to decide between
these alternative theories.43 It did acknowledge, however, that the importance
of the federal question involved may require further review after a "fully
focused inquiry" by the state courts. 44 It thus left open the potentially trouble-
some question of the status of the royalties paid by Lear to Adkins prior to
the issuance of the patent.
The encouragement of disclosure and public use is the raison d'etre of federal
patent law and its quite limited monopoly grant. The Supreme Court by its
abrogation of licensee estoppel has perhaps reached a paradoxical result, for
the holding, especially in view of the fact that even before Lear the chances
that a patent litigation would be worthwhile to the holder of the patent were
minimal,4 5 has now made trade secret protection4" an even more attractive
alternative to patent protection,47 a development which may prove inimical
43. The Lear-Adkins relationship deviated from the normal licensing agreement in at
least one aspect-the patent had not yet been granted. Lear, therefore, had the unusual
advantage of immediate access to ideas which it would normally learn only after issuance
of the patent, since pending patent applications and their contents are kept secret until
final action. 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a) (1969). The Supreme Court, by considering the pro-patent
royalties, thus had the opportunity to decide whether Adkins should receive payment for
revealing what would normally be a trade secret. Since trade secret protection is a concern
of state law, the Court could have properly decided which interpretation of Sears and
Compco was the valid one by either, accepting state trade secret law because Congress had
not passed any preemptive legislation or precluding trade secret protection on the ground
that the patent clause relegates all protection of creative rights to the federal patent or
copyright statutes.
44. 395 U.S. at 675. Contrast, however, the opinion of Mr. Justice Black, with whom
Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas agreed, which dissented as to this point. See
note 52 infra and accompanying text.
45. Since the odds of a patent being sustained in an infringement suit are one in three,
and since the chances of recovering more in damages than the cost of the original patent
prosecution and the present litigation are about one in ten even if the patent is held valid
and infringed, the chances of a profitable termination of the suit are one in thirty. Chope,
Conflicts Between Patents and the Antitrust Laws, 49 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 819, 826-27 (1967).
In the United States approximately 60% of all patents considered by the courts are wholly
or partially invalidated. Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Review of the American Patent System, S. Rep. No. 1464, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1956). Of the 686 federal court of appeals decisions reported In the
United States Patent Quarterly between January of 1956 and March of 1967, plaintiff was
successful in only 29% of the cases. Mahon, Trade Secrets and Patents Compared, 50 J.
Pat. Off. Soc'y 536, 540 (1968).
46. A generally accepted definition of trade secrets is found in the Restatement of Torts
§ 757, comment b at 5 (1939): "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." See
generally 2 R. Calman, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies
§§ 51-59 (3d ed. 1968).
47. See Mahon, supra note 45, for a good contrast between patents and trade secrets.
A prerequisite of patent protection is the issuance of a patent which must first overcome
statutory hurdles of utility (35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964)), novelty (35 U.S.C. § 102 (1964)),
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to the disclosure of new inventions.4" "To the extent scientific information is
kept secret, there is a strong retarding factor in the advance of technology. ....
There are many fields where trade secrets are now the practical substitute or
alternative to patent protection .... To the extent secrets such as these are
nonobviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964)), risk of interference proceedings (35 U.S.C. § 135
(1964)), and often the time and expense of patent prosecution. Trade secret protection, on
the other hand, requires "discovery," rather than the higher form of "invention" required
by patents, a discovery which is secret in fact. See Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk
Mills, Inc., 357 F2d 866 (1st Cir. 1966). The nature of the discovery must be such that
the developed product is not amenable to an analysis which by retrofitting or "back-
engineering" will readily give up the secret. A wrist watch, for example, can hardly be
protected as a trade secret since it can readily be taken apart and the secret discovered,
whereas the Coca-Cola formula remains a secret and thus protectable. Trade secret pro-
tection, therefore, requires less original effort than the patent novelty search, the effectiveness
of which the inventor-patentee cannot be certain until after litigation. MAeanwhile, he has
lost all chance of trade secret protection, for upon issuance the contents of the patent are
made public. 37 C.F.R. § 1.11 (Supp. 1969); 37 C.F.R. § 1.13 (1967). A finding of in-
validity in a later infringement suit, therefore, leaves the inventor with nothing. See note 45
supra for the probabilities of such a finding.
Once the protection exists the nature of the right is likewise different. Patent protection
is for seventeen years and the holder's remedy is an infringement suit, while trade secret
protection is theoretically unlimited, although the possibility of its disclosure by inspection
or independent discovery is ever-present. In litigation seeking to protect a trade secret the
chances of success, on the other hand, are approximately 47%o. Mahon, supra note 45, at
540 (the author arrives at this figure from an examination of trade secret cases found in
the American Digest System from 1936-1966). While the scope of a patent is precisely
defined by the claims, a court in a trade secret case will apply equity rather than a minute
analysis and comparison. See Engelhard Indus., Inc. v. Research Instruments Corp, 324
F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964). Furthermore, in such a suit
secrecy can be preserved by requesting in camera proceedings. See State ex rel. Ampco
Metal, Inc. v. O'Neill, 273 Wis. 530, 78 N.W.2d 921 (1956); Annot, 62 A.L.R.2d 509
(1958). When the holder of a patent loses his suit, the outcome opens up the knov-hov- of
the patent to the public at large, whereas the owner of a trade secret, having gained the
"lead time" for his own development of the discovery while it was still secret, may find
that a competitor, who has won the suit, recognizes the commercial advantage of keeping
the discovery secret. Although the former, therefore, loses his knowledge to the world, the
latter may lose it only to his adversary in the suit.
Even if the trade secret is discovered and then patented, the original owner of the secret
is probably safe. Although he cannot claim to have anticipated the patent so as to in-
validate it, see, e.g., Gillman v. Stem, 114 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
718 (1941), in an infringement suit the patentee must seek discovery in the nature of a
"fishing expedition" which few courts will condone or else make out a prima facie case
raising questions to which the information sought is material. Lever Bros. Co. v. Proctor
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 38 F. Supp. 680 (D. Md. 1941). See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 383
(1951).
48. This is a fundamental purpose of the federal patent laws. See Pennock v. Dialogue,
27 US. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829). They were proposed to replace the system of trade secrecy which
existed in the guilds during the Middle Ages. Harris, Patents and Trade Secrets: Instru-
ments of Positive Competition, 12 Idea 631, 633 (1968).
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relied upon and maintained, the patent system has failed and the interchange
of scientific information is retarded.1 49
A reshifting of the balance of attractiveness, either by relaxing the limits of
patent protection or by limiting the scope of trade secret protection, 0 may be
necessary to resolve this apparent policy contradiction in Lear. The majority
in Lear has reserved for future decision after further determinations by state
courts "whether, and to what extent, the States may protect the owners of
unpatented inventions who are willing to disclose their ideas to manufacturers
only upon payment of royalties."51 The question whether Sears and Compco
are to be interpreted as precluding trade secret protection as an alternative
to patent protection, therefore, is left open. Justices Black, Warren, and Doug-
las dissented on this point since they believed this reservation to be in conflict
with Sears and Compco: "One who makes a discovery may, of course, keep it
secret if he wishes, but private arrangements under which self-styled 'inventors'
do not keep their discoveries secret, but rather disclose them, in return for
contractual payments, run counter to the plan of our patent laws .... ."5" This
view seems to be at least more consistent with the promotion of disclosure since
it makes trade secret protection less attractive. Such a view, in fact, is an in-
terpretation of Sears and Compco as a "disability ... as imposed . . . from the
patent clause ' *a preempting all state law protecting creative rights, with the
possible exception of situations involving breach of a fiduciary relationship by
employees or others and industrial espionage.54
49. Frost, Patent Rights and the Stimulation of Technical Change, in Patents and
Progress 61, 67-68 (W. Alderson, V. Terpstra, and S. Shapiro ed. 1965).
50. Although the Lear decision left open the trade secret question, it should be noted
again that there is authority for the proposition that trade secret protection has been abro-
gated since Sears and Compco. 395 U.S. at 677 (dissenting opinion); Van Prods. Co. v.
General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 269-71, 213 A.2d 769, 780-81 (1965) (con-
curring opinion); Adelman, supra note 37, at 715-16; see Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967) ; Cable Vision, Inc.
v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965) (these last
two cases felt that the Sears and Compco decisions killed all state unfair competition laws
and, by implication, this would include trade secret protection). Contra, Doerfer, The Limits
on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 1432 (1967); Comment, The Stiffel Doctrine and the Law of Trade Secrets, 62 Nw.
L. Rev. 956 (1968); Note, Trade Secrets After Sears and Compco, 53 Va. L. Rev. 356
(1967) ; see cases cited in note 54 infra.
51. 395 U.S. at 674. This is the situation with respect to the royalties paid prior to the
1960 grant of the patent, during which period the relationship between the parties was, In
effect, that of licensor and licensee of a trade secret.
52. Id. at 677 (dissenting opinion). A similar view was proposed by Adelman: "[The
law of trade secrets should not be applied to protect any invention in commercial use which
can be maintained in secret indefinitely if it is not the subject of a pending patent appli-
cation." Adelman, supra note 37, at 715.
53. Treece, supra note 42, at 83.
54. A number of decisions, in fact, have distinguished trade secrets from the scope of
the Sears and Compco reasoning on such a basis. E.g., Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir. 1965); Servo Corp. of America v. General
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The possibility that the rationale of the Sears and Compco decisions will lead
to the abrogation of all state law of unfair competition, a course left open by
the Lear court's refusal to decide the question of royalties on an unpatented
article, has, in fact, prompted a legislative proposal which would undermine
such an interpretation. 55 The following amendment to the patent law was re-
cently introduced:
§ 301 Preservation of other rights.
This title shall not be construed to pre-empt or otherwise affect in any way, con-
tractual or other rights or obligations, not in the nature of patent rights, imposed by
State or Federal law on particular parties with regard to inventions or discoveries,
whether or not subject to this title.50
A claim of patent invalidity has long been a defense to an infringement suit
which was available to those not in privity with the holder of the patent. Lear
has now made it available to those enjoying a contractual relationship with the
holder. The question arises, however, whether an allegation of invalidity can
be used not only as a defense to a suit for royalties, but also as a counterclaim
for previously paid royalties in a licensee-infringement suit or even as a separate
cause of action for breach of contract for failure of consideration, with the
return of all previously paid royalties as damages.5 7
Elec. Co, 337 F.2d 716, 723-25 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 US. 934 (1966) ; Schulen-
burg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 III. 2d 379, 386-87, 212 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 959 (1966).
55. In 1944, for example, the Mercoid cases virtually eliminated the remedy of con-
tributory infringement. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944);
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944). The remedy,
however, was reinstated in the 1952 revision of the patent laws. Act of July 19, 1952, ch.
950, § 271(c), 66 Stat. 811 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1964)).
56. S. 2756, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1969).
57. The following situation may well be imagined: A Corporation, even though it is
unsure as to the validity of B's patent, decides that it cannot now afford the cost or un-
certainty of an infringement suit and, therefore, agrees to operate under a licensing agree-
ment with B. After A Corp. has made a large profit from the sale of the product covered
by the patent, it decides that it no longer desires to pay royalties. It not only refuses to
pay royalties any longer, but it also sues B for all previously paid royalties on the ground
that the patent was invalid, thus constituting a failure of consideration and an unlawful
monopoly in violation of the policy of the antitrust laws. Though the result of this hypo-
thetical situation cannot be found in existing case law due to the heretofore existence of
the doctrine of licensee estoppel, there have been decisions as to the effect of a declaration
of patent invalidity in an action between the patentee and a third party not in privity with
him in which a licensee was released from any further obligation to pay royalties because
of a failure of consideration once the patent was declared invalid. Patterson-Ballagh Corp.
v. Byron Jackson Co., 145 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain
Co., 63 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1933); Ross v. Fuller & Warren Co., 105 F. 510 (C.C.N.D.N.Y.
1900). For the reasoning behind such holdings see R. Ellis, Patent Assignments §§ 347-48
(3d ed. 1955); A. Deller, Deller's Walker on Patents § 355 (2d ed. 1965), in which it is
stated that a patent has some value until it is held invalid and, having some value, cannot
be questioned by the courts as to the sufficiency of that value. See Warner Bros. Co. v.
19701
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The Lear Court did state that if Lear can prove patent invalidity it may
avoid payment of all royalties due after issuance of Adkins' patent, but the
problem never actually arose since Lear refused to honor the license agreement
before the patent ever issued. Since the Lear holding adds a public interest
consideration to a purely contractual approach, it seems at least arguable that
past royalties can also be recovered.
One additional problem created by the rejection of licensee estoppel is the
possibility that patent validity will be decided in any suit for royalties. Hence,
if the amount involved is quite small, even municipal courts may be ruling on
the numerous and complex reasons for patent invalidity.68 The desirability of
such a result seems highly debatable.59
Perhaps the root cause of the problems raised by this decision, however, is
not the recent incursions of antitrust policy, by which any scheme which der-
ogates free competition and the free flow of ideas is strictly construed, upon
the realm of the patent monopoly6Q-the public policy approach. On the con-
American Lady Corset Co., 48 F. Supp. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), afl'd, 136 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.
1943), for a holding that invalidity does not absolve a licensee from royalties; Wynne v.
Aluminum Awning Prods. Co., 148 F. Supp. 212 (M.D.N.C. 1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d 130 (4th
Cir. 1953), for a holding that a licensee is entitled to recover prior payments.
In addition, there has been a long standing exception to the doctrine of licensee estoppel
known as repudiation. Because of a public interest that commerce and production should
not be clogged by invalid patents, a licensee has been permitted to repudiate the licensing
contract and, having abandoned the protection of the patent, assert the invalidity of the
patent as a defense to a suit by the licensor for the repudiation and the subsequent failure
to pay royalties. See, e.g., Universal Rim Co. v. Scott, 21 F.2d 346 (N.D. Ohio 1922);
Armstrong Co. v. Shell Co., 98 Cal. App. 769, 277 P. 887 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929); Marston
v. Swett, 82 N.Y. 526 (1880); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Bulova Watch Co., 281 App. Div.
219, 118 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1st Dep't 1953). See generally Note, The Doctrine of Licensee Re-
pudiation in Patent Law, 63 Yale L.J. 125 (1953). In the hypothetical case, the result in
the event that there was a repudiation would be that the licensee could not recover previous
royalties paid while he was protected by the patent. Universal Rim. Co. v. Scott, supra;
Armstrong Co. v. Shell Co., supra.
In Lear there was no repudiation, since its actions did not equal the degree of definiteness
which is required since "an equivocal stand would permit a licensee to defend an action
for royalties with a claim of repudiation and to defeat a suit for infringement by pointing
to the license." Note, supra, at 128.
58. See N.Y.L.J., July 10, 1969, at 1, col. 7-8.
59. A possible solution to such a problem would be the adoption by Congress of the
American Law Institute proposal that a federal defense, such as patent invalidity, serve as
a basis for removal to a federal district court. See ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts, Proposed Judicial Code § 1312(a) (2) (Tentative Draft
No. 3, April 15, 1965). This proposal would, in effect, if adopted, supersede the ruling In
Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
60. If, however, one does view the Lear decision solely as an antitrust one, by Its re-
moval of the bar of estoppel to challenge the patent, the Court seems consistent with other
recent antitrust decisions which seem to have rejected the defenses of pari delicto, Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), and unclean hands,
Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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trary, the basic problem may very well be the current lack of predictability as
to the validity of a patent upon its issuance since so many patents are subse-
quently invalidated by the courts.6 1 Business considerations of considerable
import may be vitally dependent upon the patent's validity, '- and it seems as
if judicial conceptions of patentability are quite different from those of the
Patent Office.63 Two available cures would be a strong financial boost which
would give the Patent Office the resources to make a complete decision as to
patentability, or a change in the patent system so that judicial review of pa-
tentability occurs before, not after, issuance."4 These may create an attractive
reason for opting for patent protection-the certainty of a patent whose validity
has been fully litigated prior to the making of necessary and costly business
decisions.
Torts--California Allows Bystander Recovery Under Doctrine of Strict
Tort Liability.--In 1962, plaintiff Elmore purchased a new automobile; less
than two months later, she was involved in a collision with the automobile of
plaintiff Waters. At the time of the accident, the Elmore car had been driven less
than 3,000 miles and had been properly serviced at a facility operated by
defendant Mission, a distributor authorized by the manufacturer. Examination
of the vehicle after the accident produced evidence of a defective driveshaft
and steering box, although there was no direct evidence that these defects
existed at the time of sale, or that they were the proximate cause of the acci-
dent. Alleging strict tort liability, plaintiff Waters brought suit against both the
manufacturer and distributor of plaintiff Elmore's car to recover for her
personal injuries and for the wrongful death of her husband.' The trial court
granted defendants' motion for nonsuit without allowing the case to go to the
jury.2 The court of appeal affirmed on the grounds that the evidence introduced
61. See note 45 supra.
62. For a recognition of this problem by the President see 3 Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents 294 (1967).
63. It is apparent that lack of personnel and equipment has forced the Patent Office into
the position of granting patents without an adequate investigation into the novelty, utility,
invention, and prior art necessary for a proper determination of patentability. The result
is the plethora of subsequent findings of invalidity by the judiciary. See note 45 supra. A
key argument, for example, against the patentability of computer programs is the lack of
classification technique and research files. Bender, Computer Programs: Should They Be
Patentable?, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 241, 250-51 n.47 (1968).
64. See Topol, Patents and Hunting Licenses-Some Iconoclastic Comments and an
Irreverent Solution, 17 Am. U.L. Rev. 424, 439-43 (1968).
1. This action was consolidated for trial with the personal injury action of plaintiff
Elmore, who proceeded against the same parties.
2. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 615, 617, 451 P2d 84, 85, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652, 653 (1969) (en banc).
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was insufficient to make out a prima facie case of strict tort liability,3 and did
not discuss plaintiff Waters' status as a bystander.4 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of California, sitting en banc, reversed, and held that a prima facie case
had been made out and, further, that an action in strict tort liability was
maintainable by an injured bystander.3 Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70
Cal.2d 615, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (en banc).
In 1962, California took a progressive step in the development of products
liability law by imposing manufacturers' strict liability in tort, independent
from warranty. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,O plaintiff was injured
while using a power tool received by him as a gift. In his suit against the
manufacturer, plaintiff alleged both negligence and breach of an express warranty
contained in the manufacturer's brochure. Defendant claimed plaintiff's failure
to fulfill the notice requirement of the Uniform Sales Act 7 was a defense to
the warranty claim. The Supreme Court of California, sitting en banc, refused
to apply the notice requirement of the Sales Act in actions by injured consumers
against manufacturers with whom they have not dealt.8 Noting the growth of
strict liability in cases involving products inherently dangerous if defective,
the court declared that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." D
3. Waters v. American Motors Corp., 69 Cal. Rptr. 799 (Ct. App. 1968). The court felt
that there was insufficient evidence to support an inference that a defect existed at the
time of sale and that this defect was the proximate cause of the accident. Id. at 805. The
court relied on Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d
826 (1964), where the New Jersey court held: "[I]n the absence of direct evidence that
the product is defective because of a manufacturing flaw or inadequate design, or other
evidence which would permit an inference that a dangerous condition existed prior to
sale, it is necessary to negate other causes of the failure of the product for which the
defendant would not be responsible, in order to make it reasonable to infer that a dangerous
condition existed at the time defendant had control." Id. at 184, 199 A.2d at 830.
4. 69 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
5. The court distinguished Jakubowski, finding that there a fellow employee had used
the defective disc, creating the possibility that plaintiff's injuries were caused by prior misuse
and not by a manufacturing defect; in Elmore there was no evidence that anyone had
handled the driveshaft after the car was sold. 70 Cal. 2d at 621-22, 451 P.2d at 87-88, 75
Cal. Rptr. at 655-56. Therefore, the court found an inference that a dangerous condition
existed prior to sale. Quaere: Is the distinction sound, or has California, in effect, held that
the plaintiff can establish both defect and proximate cause by circumstantial evidence, with-
out negating the possibility that the injury might have been caused by something for
which neither the defendant manufacturer nor retailer would be liable?
6. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (en bane).
7. Uniform Sales Act § 49 (act withdrawn 1965) provided: "But, if, after acceptance
of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise
or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such
breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor." Cf. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-607(3) (a)
[hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
8. 59 Cal. 2d at 61, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
9. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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Under Greenman, liability is established when the plaintiff proves he was injured
while using the product in the manner for which it was intended, under such
circumstances that he was not aware of the defect which made the product
unsafe for its intended use.' 0 The court established that this liability is imposed
by law and not voluntarily assumed by the sales contract." It observed that
such liability would "insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."' 2
In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,13 this liability was extended to include
distributors of defective products. There, plaintiff had purchased an automobile
from defendant dealer. After an accident resulting from defective brakes, plain-
tiff brought a personal injury action against both the manufacturer and distrib-
utor. Defendant retailer denied liability, claiming the liability imposed by
Greenman was applicable only to manufacturers, thus allowing retailers to
contractually limit their liability.' 4 The court disagreed, stressing that the
retailer was an integral part of the producing and marketing complex which
properly should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products.",
The court felt that imposing strict liability on both the manufacturer and the
distributor would not be unjust, as they could "adjust the costs of such protec-
tion between them in the course of their continuing business relationship."' 6
Furthermore, the distributor's liability would be an additional incentive to
producing safe products. Therefore, the court found the retailer "strictly liable
in tort for personal injuries caused by defects in cars sold by it,"' 7 in spite of
its contractual warranty disclaimer.
As of 1964, strict tort liability allowed recovery by purchasers and users
from both manufacturers and retailers of defective products. It was unclear
whether an injured bystander could recover, although Greenman's definition of
tort liability for "injury to a human being,"'8 appears to allow bystander re-
covery. Since the privity requirement arose out of warranty, 0 a specie of re-
10. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
11. Id. at 63, 377 PId at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
12. Id.
13. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (en banc).
14. Id. at 262 n.1, 391 P.2d at 171 n.1, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899 n.1. The retailer warranted
that the product was free from defects in material and workmanship, but limited the
warranty to the lesser of 90 days or 4,000 miles. Liability was limited to replacement of
defective parts, and this warranty was in lieu of all other warranties and obligations express
or implied. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
15. 61 Cal. 2d at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
16. Id. at 263, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
17. Id.
18. 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (emphasis added).
19. Breach of warranty was originally a tort action. See Ames, The History of Assumpsit,
2 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1888). Subsequently, it developed into an action based solely upon
contract. See Hamilton, The Ancient laxim Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale LJ. 1133 (1931).
Accordingly, in 1842, the English Court of Exchequer held that the manufacturer or
vendor of a chattel owed a duty of care only to those with whom he contracted, stating:
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covery independent from strict tort liability,20 its incorporation into the law of
strict liability does not seem mandatory. In light of the social engineering
apparent in Greenman, Elmore must be regarded as a logical step. The pos-
sibility of allowing bystander recovery in such cases also has been noted in
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which abolished lack of
privity as a defense, resorting to strict liability limited by a foreseeability
test.2 ' However, in an Official Comment, the Institute expressed "neither
approval nor disapproval of expansion of the rule to permit recovery by such
persons [casual bystanders]. 22
The first California movement toward allowing bystander recovery absent
proof of negligence began in 1944. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,23 plain-
tiff waitress was injured when a bottle of soft drink exploded in her hand. She
alleged negligence and relied on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, as she was
unable to prove any specific acts of negligence.24 Although the majority allowed
recovery on a negligence theory,25 Justice Traynor, concurring, as he did in
Elmore, observed:
[I] believe the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled out as the basis
of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases like the present one. In my opinion it should
now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings. . . . Even if there is no
negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it
will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective prod-
ucts that reach the market .... Those who suffer injury from defective products are
unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or
"Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into
them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would
ensue.' Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842). See W. Prosser.
Torts § 96 (3d ed. 1964); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27
Minn. L. Rev. 117 (1943); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
20. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896, 900 (1964) (en banc).
21. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965) provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any produce in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged In the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
22. Id., comment o at 357. The drafters further commented that strict liability may
also be treated as a matter of warranty. Id., comment m at 355.
23. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
24. Id. at 457, 150 P.2d at 438.
25. Id. at 460-61, 150 P.2d at 440.
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health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless
one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among
the public as a cost of doing business.26
Recently a number of jurisdictions have cast Lord Abinger's dire warnings -7
to the winds and have rejected the privity barrier. In Piercefield v. Remington
Arms Co.,28 the Mfichigan Supreme Court allowed a bystander recovery on
a theory of breach of warranty. There, the plaintiff was injured when the barrel
of a shotgun fired by his brother exploded due to defendant's defective ammuni-
tion. Although the court did not adopt the strict liability doctrine, it ruled that
the bystander's lack of privity did not preclude recovery for breach of war-
ranty.29 Further, the court held that the warranty breached was implied by law,
independently of the sales contract;30 therefore, plaintiff's failure to meet the
Uniform Sales Act notice requirement 3 did not defeat the action.32 In
Mitchell v. Miller,33 an automobile with a defective transmission rolled driverless
down an incline, striking the plaintiff's decedent, a bystander. The Superior
Court of Connecticut observed a significant trend towards imposing strict liabil-
ity for injuries resulting from defective products if the injury is foreseeable or
reasonable. 4 In adopting the doctrine, the court stated: "The public policy
which protects the user and consumer should also protect the innocent by-
stander." 35
Perhaps the most novel philosophy justifying bystander recovery was advanced
by the Elmore court, which expressed the belief that bystanders are entitled
to an even greater amount of protection than consumers or users if a bystander
injury is reasonably foreseeable. The court noted that consumers and users have
an opportunity to inspect products and limit purchases, while bystanders are
truly innocent and powerless 3 Thus, the concepts of social engineering first
expressed by Justice Traynor in Escola dictate extension of the strict tort
liability doctrine.
Other states have not yet permitted bystander recovery as California did
in Elmore. For example, while greatly expanding the protection of products
26. Id. at 461-62, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (citation omitted). It is noteworthy that the
majority did not concur in Justice Traynor's opinion. See generally R. Pound, New Paths
of the Law 38-47 (1950); Pound, The Problem of the Exploding Bottle, 40 Boston U.L.
Rev. 167 (1960).
27. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). See note 19 supra.
28. 375 Mfich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
29. Id. at 98, 133 N.W.2d at 135.
30. Id. at 100, 133 N.W.2d at 136.
31. See note 7 supra.
32. 375 Mich. at 100, 133 N.W.2d at 136. Although the court specifically declined to
adopt the strict tort liability doctrine, its citation of, and adherence to, Greenman indicates
it may have achieved the same result.
33. 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965).
34. Id. at 149-50, 214 A.2d at 698.
35. Id. at 150, 214 A2d at 699.
36. 70 Cal. 2d at 623-24, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
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liability in other areas, 37 New York has not allowed bystander recovery for
breach of warranty, or, perhaps more appropriately, for strict tort liability. 8
Despite Chief Judge Cardozo's now familiar statement that "[t]he assault upon
the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace," 39 the courts have
been adamant in this area.
In its 1916 decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,40 the court of appeals
abolished the privity requirement in negligence actions. Yet, in 1928, the same
court unanimously held that "[t]here can be no warranty where there is no
privity of contract." 4' After the privity requirement was relaxed somewhat
through the use of an agency theory,2 in Greenberg v. Lorenz4 a the court of
appeals extended warranty protection for food and household goods to the
purchaser's entire household, irrespective of privity. While responding to past
injustice and impracticality, 4 the court suggested taking only one step at a
time.45 In 1962, Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,40 abrogated
37. See Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399,
226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d
39 (1961); Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (4th Dep't 1962).
38. See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963). While the decision was based on warranty, the court
of appeals cited Greenman and its strict liability theory as "surely a more accurate
phrase." Id. The dissent found an implication in the majority opinion that the only
difference between warranty and strict liability was one of phrasing. Id. at 440, 191 N.E.2d
at 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 597. Cf. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460,
466-67, 255 N.E.2d 173, 176-77, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942, 946-47 (1969) (concurring opinion);
Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490
(1969).
39. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
40. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
41. Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 74, 161 N.E. 423, 424 (1928).
42. See Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931)
(wife purchased bread containing a foreign substance for plaintiff husband); Bowman v.
Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 284 App. Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S.2d 904 (4th Dep't 1954), aft'd
mem., 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 165 (1955) (sister purchased salad oil containing decayed
mouse for plaintiff sister); Mouren v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 139 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sup.
Ct. 1955), modified, 1 App. Div. 2d 767, 148 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 1 N.Y.2d
884, 136 N.E.2d 715, 154 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1956) (plaintiff husband purchased tainted meat
for plaintiff wife).
43. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961), where infant plaintiff's father
purchased food for the family. The court cited U.C.C. § 2-318, which at the time had not
been adopted in New York, and established a presumption that the purchase was for the
entire household.
44. See, e.g., N.Y. L. Revision Commission, Act and Recommendation Relating to
Warranties of Fitness, No. 65(A), at 21 (1945); Miller, Manufacturers' Product Liability,
24 N.Y. State B. Bull. 313 (1952); Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785
(1916), where a butcher who sold tainted pork chops was held to warrant them to husband
purchaser, but not to purchaser's wife.
45. 9 N.Y.2d at 200, 173 N.E.2d at 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
46. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962). There, the defendant
manufacturer advertised that fabrics finished with his product would not shrink. The
plaintiff, a clothing manufacturer, purchased treated fabric from a fabric manufacturer, but
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the privity requirement in actions for breach of express warranty brought by
remote purchasers of non-foodstuffs, as the court of appeals concluded that the
privity requirement, as enunciated in Chysky v. Drake Brothers Co.,4 7 should be
rejected.
Interpreting Randy, the appellate division, second department said: "[I]t
would appear that the majority of the Court of Appeals has dispensed, without
qualification, with the court-made traditional requirement of privity."4 8 However,
it is significant that the case involved an employee of the contracting party, not
a traditional bystander. In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,40 the court
applied a warranty theory to permit recovery without privity. However, it
should be noted that the plaintiff was a "consumer" or "user" within the scope
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,50 and not a bystander. Finally, in
Berzon v. Don Allen Motors, Inc.,51 a case involving a bystander plaintiff, the
appellate division, fourth department dismissed the complaint, stating: "To
extend Goldberg further to include bystanders and strangers, such as the plain-
tiffs, would be such a radical departure from established law that if it is
accomplished it should be done by legislative action and not judicial pronounce-
ment."
52
However, the courts' passing of the issue to the legislature53 is open to
the finished garments shrank. The remote purchaser was found to have a cause of action
against the manufacturer who induced the purchase by express warranty, despite the lack
of privity.
47. 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
48. Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 App. Div. 2d 661, 662, 230 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478
(2d Dep't 1962) (mem.) (emphasis added), where plaintiff's employer purchased a safety
mask from defendant. Plaintiff alleged that he was seriously injured as a consequence of
defendant's breach of implied warranties. The court held that the implied warranties ran
to the purchaser's employees regardless of contractual privity. It should be noted that the
dictum mentioned by the appellate division was not truly dictum. Further, the phraces
"without qualification" and "without limitation" are contained in the concurring, and not
the majority opinion.
49. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 781, 240 N.YS.2d 592 (1963). After an airplane crash,
plaintiff administratrix sued for the wrongful death of her daughter, alleging breach of
warranty by the airline, the manufacturer of the plane, and the manufacturer of the plane's
allegedly defective altimeter. The court of appeals held that passengers on the plane were
"users" entitled to the protection of the manufacturer's waranty, but refused to impose
liability on the component part manufacturer.
50. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). See note 21 supra.
51. 23 App. Div. 2d 530, 256 N.Y..2d 643 (4th Dep't 1965) (mem.).
52. Id. at 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 644. But see Accelerated Trucking Corp. v. McLean
Trucking Co., 51 Misc. 2d 321, 278 N.Y.S.2d 516 (Civ. Ct. 1967), where a lower court
observed that "[wjhether liability extends to bystanders and strangers, not employees of
the lessee or bailee, on the theory of strict liability in tort, founded upon breach of implied
warranty of fitness, is unresolved in New York." Id. at 326, 278 N.YS.2d at 522.
53. See, e.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 16, 181
N.E.2d 399, 405, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 371 (1962) (Froessel, J., concurring); Greenberg v.
Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 201, 173 N.E.2d 773, 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44 (1961) (Froessel, J.,
concurring); Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 443, 225 N.YS.2d 137, 143 (4th
Dep't 1962) (McClusky, J., dissenting).
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serious question. Section 2-318 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code
limited the privity requirement by extending the vendor's warranties to in-
clude the family or household of the buyer and household guests, if they are
reasonably foreseeable.5 It should be noted that this section was specifically
designed to set minimum warranty protections arising out of the sales contract;
it was not intended to restrict developing case law.65 The 1965 Conference of
New York Supreme Court Trial Justices noted that "Section 2-318 dealing with
the requirement of privity in a breach of warranty action does not freeze court
development of policy in the area of products liability. Rather, it sets forth
a rule of minimum liberality which is below the present New York common law
development in this area, and far below the expected future development."50
Other states have begun this development. For example, in 1962, Virginia
abolished the privity requirement in its Uniform Commercial Code, employing
a foreseeability test to limit liability.57 In 1966, the foreseeability standard
was also shattered, apparently to permit true bystander recovery. 8 Nevertheless,
New York's legislative attempts to permit bystander recovery for breach of
warranty59 have been to no avail; section 2-318 remains unamended. In light of
the avowed legislative purpose to allow judicial expansion of products liability,
it seems unwise for New York's courts to further await legislative action.
It is strange that New York, which has taken the lead in many areas of the
tort law in the past two decades, 0 has failed to move forward to protect the
54. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318. This result was often reached under the privity and notice
requirements of the Uniform Sales Act. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.
2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (en banc); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (en banc); Piercefield v.
Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
55. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 3.
56. Ad. Board of the judicial Conference of the State of N.Y., Eleventh Annual
Report, Leg. Doc. (1966) No. 90, at 118.
57. Va. Code Ann. § 8.2-318 (1965) provides: "Lack of privity between plaintiff and
defendant shall be no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer or seller of
goods to recover damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence,
although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff
was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use,
consume, or be affected by the goods . . .!
58. Va. Code Ann. § 8-654.4 (Supp. 1968) provides: "In cases not provided for in
§ 8.2-318 where recovery of damages for injury to person, including death, or to property
resulting from negligence is sought, lack of privity between the parties shall be no defense."
59. See, e.g., 1969 N.Y. Legislative Record and Index: Senate Introductory Rec., No.
1429, at S129; Assembly Introductory Rec., No. 2737, at A248.
60. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 708,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d
34 (1961); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961);
Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958); Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y.
349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
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bystander. "There is no earthly reason why the pernicious life of the privity
requirement... persists insofar as warranty actions are concerned when as far
back as 1916, it had been removed from the negligence action ... ."1 If the
purpose of products liability law is to provide compensation to victims of
defective goods, that purpose is frustrated by refusing to allow bystander re-
covery where it is reasonably foreseeable that such injury may result. In Elmore,
California has taken a progressive step.
Torts-Rescue Doctrine-Not Limited to Negligence Situations.-Due
to a defective gas mask manufactured by defendant, decedent Rooney died of
asphyxiation, despite the plaintiffs" rescue efforts. Rooney's estate recovered
damages from defendant for breach of warranty.2 Thereafter, plaintiffs brought
suit to recover for their injuries, alleging the defendant's breach of warranty
served as a basis for application of the rescue doctrine.3 The trial court entered
judgment for plaintiffs; the appellate division affirmed.4 On appeal, a unanimous
court of appeals, two justices concurring in a separate opinion, affirmed and
held that the rescue doctrine is not restricted to cases where the causative wrong
is negligence, but is available wherever a person, by his culpable act, places
another in peril. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255
N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969).
The rescue doctrine is by no means new to New York law. Nearly a century
and a half ago, in the famous Balloon case," the court recognized that cat-
astrophic occurrences have a magnetic influence upon bystanders which attracts
61. Parish v. Great AUt. & Pac. Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 46, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7, 20 (Mun.
Ct. 1958) (citation omitted). Privity has also been called an "artificial structure," Jaeger,
Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 Duquesne L. Rev. 1 (1963), an "archaic
and senseless doctrine," id. at 3, an "outmoded and harsh 'requirement,'" id., and a
"baseless and untoward defense." Id. at 56.
1. Of the seven co-workers who attempted to rescue Rooney, three died and four were
seriously injured. For convenience, "plaintiffs" herein shall refer to the decedents as well as to
the surviving plaintiffs.
2. Rooney v. S.A. Healy Co., 20 N.Y.2d 42, 228 N.E.2d 383, 281 N.YS.2d 321 (1967).
3. The rescue doctrine is ordinarily applied when a plaintiff sustains injuries while at-
tempting to rescue an imperiled party. Recovery is then sought against the person responsible
for the peril. See 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 228 (1941).
4. 31 App. Div. 2d 255, 297 N.Y.S.2d 639 (2d Dep't 1969). Originally, the jury awarded a
total of $403,000 of which $300,000 was awarded to Guarino's administratrix. This was
reduced to $225,000 by stipulation. The appellate division affirmance was conditioned upon
the consent of Guarino's administratrx to a reduction to $185,000. Id. at 261, 297 N.YS.2d
at 645.
5. Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y.C. Justice Ct. 1822). There defendant was found
liable for trespass when his balloon landed in plaintiff's garden. The recovery ius held
properly to include as consequential damages the value of flowers trampled by a crowd in
attempting to aid the defendant in landing.
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them toward peril. 6 In 1871, New York first officially recognized the rescue
doctrine in Eckert v. Long Island Railroad.7 There, plaintiff's intestate was
struck by defendant's locomotive while on the railroad tracks attempting a
rescue. Defendant contended that plaintiff's contributory negligence in going
on the tracks was a bar to recovery. 8 The court of appeals disagreed, stating:
"The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence
to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such circumstances as to con-
stitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons."10 Thus, as originally con-
stituted," the rescue doctrine was of tertiary importance; it was merely an
exception to an exception 12 whereby the plaintiff sought to overcome the tradi-
tional negligence defenses by an allegation of humanitarian rescue.' 8
Some fifty years after Eckert, the rescue doctrine was given more substance
by Judge Cardozo's opinion in Wagner v. International Railway.'4 There, owing
to defendant's negligence, decedent was thrown from defendant's train. While
attempting a rescue, plaintiff fell down a raised trestle to the ground below.
In holding the defendant liable, Judge Cardozo wrote the now famous words:
6. The court said: "[I]f his descent... would ordinarily and naturally draw a crowd of
people about him . . .for the purpose of rescuing [him] from a perilous situation--all this
he ought to have foreseen, and must be responsible for." Id. at 383. Although the case con-
cerned trespass, it may be looked upon as an early indication of the foreseeabtlity of the
rescuer.
7. 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
8. In New York, contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery in negligence
actions. See 41 N.Y. Jur. Negligence § 52 (1965).
9. The court held: "For a person engaged in his ordinary affairs, or in the mere protection
of property, knowingly and voluntarily to place himself in a position where he is liable to
receive a serious injury, is negligence, which will preclude a recovery for an injury so received;
but when the exposure is for the purpose of saving life, it is not wrongful, and therefore not
negligent unless such as to be regarded either rash or reckless." 43 N.Y. at 506. However,
rescuers of property now may recover under the rescue doctrine. Restatement of Torts § 472
(1934) ; Annot., 64 A.L.R. 515 (1930). See, e.g., Breslin v. State, 189 Misc. 547, 72 N.Y.S.2d
62 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
10. 43 N.Y. at 506.
11. See, e.g., Manzella v. Rochester Ry., 105 App. Div. 12, 93 N.Y.S. 457 (4th Dep't
1905); Muhs v. Fire Ins. Salvage Corps., 89 App. Div. 389, 85 N.Y.S. 911 (2d Dep't 1903);
Manthey v. Rauenbuehler, 71 App. Div. 173, 75 N.Y.S. 714 (1st Dep't 1902); Sann v. H.W.
Johns Mfg. Co., 16 App. Div. 252, 44 N.Y.S. 641 (1st Dep't 1897); Williams v. United States
Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 82 Hun 268, 31 N.Y.S. 343 (Sup. Ct. 1894), aff'd, 147 N.Y. 693, 42 N.E.
726 (1895) ; Roll v. Northern Cent. Ry., 15 Hun 496 (Sup. Ct. 1878), aff'd mer., 80 N.Y.
647 (1880). See also Spooner v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 115 N.Y. 22 (1889).
12. Thus, the contributory negligence and assumption of the risk defenses are exceptions
to the rule of negligence liability; the rescue doctrine was an exception to those defenses.
13. See Manzella v. Rochester Ry., 105 App. Div. 12, 93 N.Y.S. 457 (4th Dep't 1905);
Muhs v. Fire Ins. Salvage Corps., 89 App. Div. 389, 85 N.Y.S. 911 (2d Dep't 1903); Manthey
v. Rauenbuehler, 71 App. Div. 173, 75 N.Y.S. 714 (1st Dep't 1902); Sann v. H.W. Johns
Mfg. Co., 16 App. Div. 252, 44 N.Y.S. 641 (1st Dep't 1897); Williams v. United States Mut.
Acc. Ass'n, 82 Hun 268, 31 N.Y.S. 343 (Sup. Ct. 1894), aff'd, 147 N.Y. 693, 42 N.E. 726
(1895).
14. 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
[Vol. 38
CASE NOTES
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not
ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recog-
nizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and
probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a
wrong also to his rescuer.'5
Wagner clearly established the two bases of the rescue doctrine. First, the rescuer
was a foreseeable party.Y6 Second, the negligent defendant owed a duty to the
rescuer independent of that owed to the victim.' 7
Thus, the rescuer's cause of action was based on the traditional negligence
tests--duty, foreseeability, and breach."8 Prior to Guarino, the negligence
oriented basis of the rescue doctrine'0 remained constant, with only small
variations,2 0 and two minor extensions. In Talbert v. Talbcrt,2 1 plaintiff-son
recovered for injuries sustained while rescuing defendant-father, who attempted
suicide. The court found the rescue doctrine applicable to an intentional host
wrong as well as to negligence.2 Second, although it was generally held that
defendant's duty to the rescuer did not arise until there was some breach of
duty toward the imperiled partyj liability was found in situations where the
rescuer was injured while seeking to correct a potentially dangerous condition.24
15. Id. at 180, 133 N.E. at 437.
16. The Wagner court said: "The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the
occasion. The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming
of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had... ." Id. (citation omitted). However, at least
two commentators find this view of foreseeability farfetched. See Note, The Extent to Which
Foreseeability as to the Persons Injured is Required in Imposing Liability for Negligence, 29
Colum. L. Rev. 53, 58 (1929); Bohlen, Book Review, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 556, 557 (1934).
17. In Wagner, the court of appeals said: "The railroad company whose train approaches
without signal is a wrongdoer toward the traveler surprised between the rails, but a wrong-
doer also to the bystander who drags him from the path .... " 232 N.Y. at 180, 133 N.E. at
438 (citation omitted).
18. See Carney v. Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902 (4th Dep't 1946) ; Laufer v.
Shapiro, 210 App. Div. 436, 206 N.Y.S. 189 (1st Dep't 1924); Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc.
2d 782, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Breslin v. State, 189 Misc. 547, 72 N.Y.S.2d 62
(Ct. Cl. 1947); Farber v. Bryce, 40 Misc. 2d 899, 244 N.Y.S.2d 212 (N.Y.C. Civ. CL 1963).
19. For an unusual argument that rescue liability might be based on principles of quasi
contract or on the civil code's theory of negotiorum gestio, see Comment, Recovery By The
Rescuer, 28 La. L. Rev. 609, 616 (1968).
20. For example, recovery was allowed in situations where defendant negligently placed
himself in danger and was the object of the rescue, where plaintiff was the rescued party and
defendant was liable for injuries sustained at the hands of the rescuer, and where the rescuer
has injured a stranger. Also, rescuers of rescuers have recovered under the doctrine. An at-
tempted rescue of property will invoke the doctrine, and it need not belong to the plaintiff,
nor must he be under a duty to rescue it. Even rescuers of rescuers of property have been
allowed recovery. W. Prosser, Torts § 51 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as W. Prosser].
See note 26 infra.
21. 22 Misc. 2d 782, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
22. Id. at 784, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
23. W. Prosser § 50, at 297 and sources cited.
24. These situations may be called preventive rescue. See Hammonds v. Haven, 280 S.W.2d
814 (Mo. 1955); 21 Mo. L. Rev. 193 (1956); 1955 Wash. U.L.Q. 427. See, e.g., Bernardine v.
New York, 268 App. Div. 444, 51 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1st Dep't 1944), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 361, 62
N.E.2d 604 (1945); Hollaran v. New York, 168 App. Div. 469, 153 N.Y.S. 447 (2d Dep't
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It was also held that the rescue need not be spontaneous, but could be the
product of planning and deliberation.25 The rescue might be carried out in a
variety of ways,2 6 so long as the rescuer's conduct was not rash, reckless, or
wanton. 27 However, the object of the rescue must be reasonably commensurate
with the risk involved in the attempt.28 Although the doctrine was generally
found applicable only where the peril was a genuine one,-"9 the recent court of
appeals decision in Provenzo v. Sam30 softened this requirement. There, plaintiff
undertook the rescue under the mistaken belief that defendant had suffered a
heart attack; actually she was intoxicated. In holding the rescue doctrine ap-
plicable, the court of appeals said: "[T]he wisdom of hindsight is not deter-
minative on the issue of the [rescue] doctrine's applicability. So long as the
rescue attempted can be said to have been a reasonable course of conduct at the
time, it is of no import that the danger was not as real as it appeared . . . .
1915); Manthey v. Rauenbuehler, 71 App. Div. 173, 75 N.Y.S. 714 (1st Dep't 1902); Roll v.
Northern Cent. Ry., 15 Hun 496 (Sup. Ct. 1878), aff'd mem., 80 N.Y. 647 (1880).
25. As the court of appeals has said: "The law does not discriminate between the rescuer
oblivious of peril and the one who counts the cost. It is enough that the act, whether Impul-
sive or deliberate, is the child of the occasion." Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176,
181, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921). But see Sirianni v. Anna, 55 Misc. 2d 553, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709
(Sup. Ct. 1967), where plaintiff was denied recovery after donating her kidney to her son In
a rescue attempt necessitated by defendant's negligence. It has been submitted that the court
improperly applied the spontaneity test to defeat recovery. See 37 Fordham L. Rev. 133
(1968).
26. For an exhaustive listing of situations in which rescuers have recovered, see Annot.,
19 A.L.R. 4 (1922), supplemented by Annot., 158 A.L.R. 189 (1945). For instances involving
the rescue of property, see Annot., 64 A.L.R. 515 (1930). As to when the rescued party him-
self may be liable to the rescuer, see Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 558 (1965).
27. Provenzo v. Sam, 23 N.Y.2d 256, 244 N.E.2d 26, 296 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1968) ; Wagner v.
International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921); Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y.
502 (1871). Thus, a charge of contributory negligence will not prevent recovery unless the
rescue appears foolhardy in its inception. "The risk of rescue, if only It be not wanton, Is
born of the occasion." Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437, 438.
Similarly, it is generally said that assumption of the risk will not defeat recovery where con-
tributory negligence cannot. See Annot., 158 A.L.R. 189, 197-98 (1945).
28. To determine the reasonableness of rescuer's conduct, the courts weigh the danger In-
volved against the probability of success and the value of the subject property. See 3 Okla.
L. Rev. 476, 477-78 (1950), citing Terry, Negligence, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1915).
29. W. Prosser § 51, at 317; Annot., 19 A.L.R. 4, 10 (1922). But see note 31 infra.
30. 23 N.Y.2d 256, 244 N.E.2d 26, 296 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1968).
31. Id. at 260, 244 N.E.2d at 28, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 325 (citation omitted). The court further
stated: "It is conceded that something more than a mere suspicion of danger to the life of
another is requisite before the [rescue] doctrine should be implemented. However, the ap-
plicability of the doctrine cannot be decided in vacuo. It must be viewed in the light of all
the facts and circumstances in each case." Id. at 261, 244 N.E.2d at 28, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
It should be noted that the court said the doctrine would be applicable where "one party by
his culpable act has placed another person in a position of imminent peril which invites a
third person, the rescuing plaintiff, to come to his aid." Id. at 260, 244 N.E.2d at 28, 296
N.Y.S.2d at 325. Although dictum, as Provenzo involved the traditional negligence fact pat-
tern, this language was used as precedent for the Guarino holding. See note 36 Infra.
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While the rescue doctrine normally has been justified by the law's high
regard for human life,32 and its desire to encourage good Samaritans, the doc-
trine is more than morally justifiable. As a matter of risk allocation, it is
reasonable that the rescuer should not be forced to bear the risk inherent in
his undertaking-he who is ultimately at fault should be responsible for the
total loss proximately resulting from his wrongdoing. However, the rescue doc-
trine traditionally has been restricted to cases in which the causative wrong was
negligence 3 3 With the recent growth in warranty and strict tort liability,34 the
extension of the rescue doctrine to accommodate such cases was inevitable.
Noting that the case was one of first impression,35 the court of appeals in
Guarino held: "We conclude that a person who by his culpable act, whether it
stems from negligence or breach of warranty, places another person in a position
of imminent peril, may be held liable for any damages sustained by a rescuer
in his attempt to aid the imperiled victim."138 The court further stated: "To
require that a rescuer answering the cry for help make inquiry as to the nature
of the culpable act that imperils someone's life would defy all logic."137 Since
both negligence and breach of warranty are culpable acts,3 8 distinctions based
on the form of the action chosen should be insignificant;3 9 the rescued party's
decision to rely on breach of warranty, rather than on negligence, should not
impede a subsequent action based on rescue.40
Judges Scileppi and Burke concurred only in the result. They would limit
any extension of the doctrine "to those cases evidencing the great moral obliga-
32. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
33. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 463, 255 N.E2d 173, 174,
306 N.Y.S.2d 942, 944 (1969).
34. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn.
L. Rev. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
35. "This is, we believe, the first instance in which the doctrine has been invoked in an
action where the gravamen of the wrong complained of has been breach of .-arranty." 25
N.Y.2d at 464, 255, N.E2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
36. Id. at 465, 255 N.E2d at 176, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 94546. As authority for its holding,
the court cited Provenzo: "As we recently held in Provenzo v. Sam. . . the rescue doctrine
should be applied when 'one party by his culpable act has placed another person in a
position of imminent peril which invites a third person, the rescuing plaintiff, to come to
his aid.'" Id. at 464, 255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.YS.2d at 945 (citation omitted).
37. Id.
38. The court said: "A breach of warranty and an act of negligence are each clearly
wrongful acts. Both terms are synonymous as regards fixation of liability, differing primarily
in their requirements of proof." Id. at 464, 255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 944-45. But
see note 44 infra.
39. "We do not believe that the theory of the action, whether it be negligence or breach
of warranty is significant where the doctrine of 'danger invites rescue' applies." Id. at 464,
255 N.E2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
40. The Guarino court called the rescue doctrine: "'[A] concept unaffected by the exact
label put upon the wrong which created the danger to the imperiled victim.'" Id. at 465,
255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 945, quoting the opinion of the appellate division;
31 App. Div. 2d at 261, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
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tions present in the case at bar."' However, this reasoning was founded more
upon a fear that Guarino might be interpreted as an approach to strict tort
liability, than upon considerations of the rescue doctrine. The concurring judges
expressly stated that they did not wish "'to join the crowd rushing through
the breaches made in the ramparts of the citadel of liability based upon
fault.' "42 Thus, both the majority and the concurring opinions attempted to
limit the Guarino holding to the rescue doctrine and to avoid the possibility
that it might be construed as an extension of warranty liability to allow by-
stander recovery.43
Although the court of appeals specifically held the rescue doctrine to be
applicable whether the rescue was necessitated by negligence or by breach of
warranty,44 it also stated that "the rescue doctrine should be applied when 'one
41. Id. at 466, 255 N.E.2d at 176, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (concurring opinion). It is difficult
to determine exactly what is meant by "great moral obligation." The fact that the rescuers
were co-workers who presumably knew Rooney personally is relevant. Presumably they
should have felt a strong compulsion to attempt rescue. However, it must be questioned
whether the rescue doctrine's high regard for human life should rest on so tenuous a rule
of law.
42. Id. at 466, 255 N.E.2d at 176-77, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (concurring opinion). They
also stated: "We are fundamentally opposed to a general application of the 'danger invites
rescue' doctrine to cases bottomed on the theory of breach of warranty for we envision a
myriad of situations where the application of the doctrine would result in unjustified liability
to manufacturers. .. . Moreover, the onrushing attempt to eliminate all distinctions between
breach of warranty and negligence liability has already gone too far." Id. at 466, 255 N.E.2d
at 176, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 946-47 (concurring opinion).
43. Both the appellate division and the court of appeals specifically restricted their deci-
sions to the rescue doctrine. The appellate division said: "The defendant attacks the judgment
as an unwarranted and unjustified extension of breach of warranty liability to non-users of
the defective instrumentality. We do not reach that question here." 31 App. Div. 2d at 258,
297 N.Y.S.2d at 642. The court of appeals said: "This appeal presents for our review the
'danger invites rescue' doctrine." 25 N.Y.2d at 463, 255 N.E.2d at 174, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
The court of appeals did not deal with defendant's contention of unwarranted products
liability extension except to state that "'the rescuer's status as a user of nonuser of the defec-
tive instrumentality is not directly relevant to our analysis.'" Id. at 465, 255 N.E.2d at 175,
306 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
44. Id. In Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969), decided five weeks prior to Guarino, the court of appeals, in a 4-3
decision over a strong dissent, held breach of warranty actions to be governed by the con-
tract statute of limitations, running from the date of sale, rather than from the date of
injury, as in tort. There, plaintiff's warranty action was time-barred before she was Injured.
However, in light of the later holding in Guarino that "' [ a ] breach of warranty . . . is not
only a violation of the sales contract out of which the warranty arises but is a tortlous
wrong.'" 25 N.Y.2d at 464, 255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 945 (quoting Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594
(1963)), it appears the Mendel holding may well be limited to issues concerning statutes of
limitation. Query: Would a rescuer be allowed to recover under Guarino where the under-
lying warranty action is barred under the Mendel holding? Since the court of appeals In
Guarino found the manufacture and distribution of the defective mask sufficient culpability
to impose rescue liability, see note 48 infra, it is submitted that the breach of warranty




party by his culpable act has placed another person in a position of imminent
peril which invites a third person, the rescuing plaintiff, to come to his aid.' "4'
Since this statement clearly implies that any culpable act may be the basis
for rescue recovery, the definition of the term obviously will be determinative
of future rescue actions. Clearly, it does not require that the defendant be
found liable to the victim, as it is generally held that the rescuer can recover
where the victim cannot, because of, for example, the victim's contributory
negligence.46 Although there have been no decisions on point, it seems clear that
a culpable act giving rise to rescue liability would be found even where there
is no completed tort as to the victim. If, for example, defendant placed victim
in a position inviting rescue, but the plaintiff-rescuer's intervention prevented
any physical or emotional injury, there would be no actionable negligence as
to the victim since injury, an essential element in negligence,-17 would be lack-
ing. Nevertheless, recovery for the rescuer seems proper as he should not be
denied recovery merely because he was successful in his efforts.
The Guarino court found the culpable act leading to rescue recovery to be
the manufacture and distribution of the defective gas mask.48 Since "culpable
act" presumably does not require a completed tort, the implication is that
mere manufacture and distribution of a defective product is sufficient culpability
to give rise to rescue liability. This view suggests an approach to strict liability
in rescue situations. It must be questioned what the result would be where a
defectively manufactured product causes bystander injury and the plaintiff
is injured in attempting to rescue the bystander. In New York, the bystander
could not at present recover from defendant for breach of warranty.40 But, if
under Guarino the rescuer need not inquire as to the nature of the culpable
act which placed the imperiled party in danger, arguably it would be incon-
sistent to require that his recovery be contingent on the victim's status. Hence,
the rescuer might recover. However, in light of Guarino's limited majority
opinion and explicit concurring opinion,50 an answer to the problem must await
future decision. But if such a future decision affords recovery to the rescuer,
it would be anomalous to deny recovery to the bystander. Thus, the future may
see Guarino cited as authority for exactly the result feared in the concurring
opinion. If such a result does arise, the court of appeals might well be forced
to re-evaluate its position on the scope of warranty protection.
45. 25 N.Y.2d at 464, 255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
46. See W. Prosser § 50, at 297; Annot., 5 A.L.R. 206 (1920). Should the victim recover
from the defendant, however, the rescuer may make offensive use of the collateral estoppel
doctrine to avoid relitigating the causality issue. See B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d
141, 225 N.E2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967) ; 47 Boston U.L. Rev. 636 (1967) ; 36 Fordham
L. Rev. 121 (1967) ; 52 Minn. L. Rev. 768 (1968). See also Guarino v. Bine Safety Appliances
Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 255, 297 N.Y.S.2d 639 (2d Dep't 1969). However, should the defendant
win the prior action, the rescuer would not be bound. See 5 J. Weinstein, H. Kom & A.
Miller, New York Civil Practice f 5011.23 (1969).
47. W. Prosser § 30, at 146.
48. The court said: "Here the defendant committed a culpable act against the decedent
Rooney, by manufacturing and distributing a defective oxygen-producing mask . ... 25
N.Y.2d at 464, 255 N.E2d at 175, 306 N.YS.2d at 945.
49. See 38 Fordham L. Rev. 579 (1970).
50. 25 N.Y2d at 466, 255 N.E.2d at 176, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 946-47.
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However, despite the possible future problems inherent in defining "culpable
act," Guarino's statement that any such act may be the basis for rescue recov-
ery 5' suggests that the court may have implied recognition of an independent
status5 2 for causes of action based on rescue. At least one commentator has
previously adopted this position.53 Once it is clear that the rescue doctrine is
not merely an exception to the rule that contributory negligence is an absolute
bar to recovery, it is submitted that there is no logical basis for retaining the
doctrine in its present limited status.54 However, whether the rescuer's right to
recover develops its own name as an independent tort,5 remains nameless,50
51. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
52. Language in the appellate division suggests the same result. "The predicate wrong-
doing creates a new basis of recovery for the rescuers. That concept, enunciated in Wagner,
permits recovery on behalf of a rescuer injured, not as a direct result of the original wrong-
doing by the tortfeasor, but by some related circumstance." 31 App. Div. at 259, 297 N.Y.S.2d
at 644.
53. F. Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts 569 n.33 (1926) states: "The rescuer's right of
action, therefore, must rest upon the view that one who imperils another, at a place where
there may be bystanders, must take into account the chance that some bystander will yield
to the meritorious impulse to save life or even property from destruction, and attempt a
rescue. If this is so, the right of action depends not upon the wrongfulness of the defendant's
conduct in its tendency to imperil the person whose rescue is attempted, but upon its ten-
dency to cause the rescuer to take the risk involved in the attempted rescue." Furthermore,
Professor Bohlen states: "The right to recover cannot be based solely upon the wrongful
conduct of the defendant towards the person imperiled. To give one person a right of action,
it is not enough that he is harmed by an act which is wrongful towards another. The act
must be wrongful to the person injured as at least tending to create an undue risk of Injury
to him. Nor has the [ordinary] rescuer any interest in the person rescued such as a husband
in the services of his wife or a master in the services of his servant. His right to recover Is,
therefore, not derived from the wrong to the person imperiled." Id.
54. For example, the traditional rescue doctrine would allow recovery where a rescuer was
injured rescuing a victim negligently placed in peril. Should he be less entitled to recover
where the defendant intentionally created the peril? An affirmative answer produces an
anomaly in which the passively negligent tortfeasor has a greater liability than the intentional
wrongdoer. A negative answer is suggested by Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc. 2d 782, 199
N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1960), a two-party situation where rescue liability was imposed upon
the defendant who intentionally imperiled himself by attempting suicide.
55. Such a cause of action would not be the first parasitic tort doctrine to achieve Inde-
pendence in its own right. Originally, mental distress was merely an element of special dam-
ages, requiring proof of impact. Recently, however, it has grown into the tort of "Infliction
of Mental or Emotional Distress." W. Prosser § 11. See, e.g., Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237,
176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
56. There now exist several "nameless" torts collectively called "prima facie tort." "A
prima fade tort derives from the ancient form of action on the case, covering those situations
where intentional harm has been inflicted, resulting in damage, by an act or series of acts
which might otherwise be lawful and which do not fall within the category of traditional
tort actions." Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 170,
172, 148 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (1st Dep't 1956). See also Advance Music Corp. v. American
Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946); American Guild of Musical Artists v.
Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E.2d 123 (1941); Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348,
34 N.E.2d 349 (1941). See generally Forkosch, Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of
Action, 42 Cornell L.Q. 465 (1957).
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or continues to be justified under the rescue doctrine, its newly broadened basis
will provide a salutory remedy for good Samaritans whose only previous remedy
required the onerous proof of negligence. Short of a legally recognized duty to
rescue,57 it should supply the necessary impetus for socially desirable rescue
efforts.
Uniform Commercial Code-Secured Transactions-Assignee Held to be
in Bad Faith and Subject to Obligor's Defenses Despite Waiver of Defense
Clauses.-Defendants, husband and wife, contracted to purchase a food freezer
from Peoples Foods, Inc., and five days later also signed a contract with Peo-
ples Food Packaging Corp. for the purchase of a food plan. Each contract was
separately assigned within twenty-four hours of each transaction to the plain-
tiff, Star Credit Corp., for a discount of twenty percent from the face value of
each contract. Included within each contract was a clause prohibiting the
purchaser from asserting against the assignee any defense that he might have
against the assignor, provided that the assignee acquired the contract in good
faith, for value, and without written notice of any claim or defense commu-
nicated within ten days of notice of the assignment by the assignee to the
obligor.' Defendants subsequently received the freezer, but received only one-
third of the food plan agreed upon. Thereafter, Peoples Food Packaging Corp.
went out of business, and the defendants declined to make any further payments
to the plaintiff on either contract.2 Star Credit then brought suit "to recover the
balance due on both contracts, together with late charges and attorneys' fees."23
Plaintiff claimed that it had procured its rights in accordance with the provisos
of the prohibition clauses, and was thus immune from any defenses that the
defendants might have against the assignor. The trial court, however, held that
the plaintiff had not acquired its rights in "good faith," and thus allowed the
defendants to assert the defense of failure of consideration against the plain-
57. It is noteworthy that an affirmative duty to rescue is recognized only in the U.S.S.R.
See Note, The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 631 (1952). Dean
Prosser has observed that "[because of [the] reluctance to countenance 'nonfeasance' as a
basis of liability, the law has persistently refused to recognize the moral obligation of common
decency and humanity, to come to the aid of another human being who is in danger, even
though the outcome is to cost [the victim] his life." W. Prosser § 54, at 336.
1. Each contract provided: "'This agreement may be assigned without notice to Buyer.
The Buyer agrees not to assert against an assignee a claim or defense arising out of the
sale under this contract provided that the assignee acquires this contract in good faith and
for value and has no notice of the facts giving rise to the claim or defense in writing
within ten days after such assignee mails to the Buyer at his address shown above notice
of the assignment of this contract.'" Star Credit Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 290, 292, 298
N.Y.S.2d 570, 573 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
2. The price of the freezer was $1222.15, while the cost of the food plan v. as $445.82.
The defendants had made $168.75 in payments for the freezer, and $111.47 for the food
plan. Id. at 291, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
3. Id. The defendants ountvrclaimed for $169.75, the amount paid on the freezer contract.
1970]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
tiff and to rescind the contract. Star Credit Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 290,
298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Civ. Ct. 1969). 4
Generally, an assignee is said to stand in the shoes of his assignor, that is, he
acquires the assignment subject to the equities and defenses available to the
obligor against the assignor.5 The obligor, however, may be prohibited, by
valid agreement with the assignor, from asserting any such equities or defenses
against the assignee. 6 These waivers have been judicially outlawed as contrary
to public policy in various jurisdictions, 7 but have been legislatively sanctioned
in others, including New York. 8
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 9-206(1) 9 provides for the in-
4. See Star Credit Corp. v. Crumb, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 1970, at 17, col. 8, where Judge
Browne stated: "I find . . . that this case is on all fours with Star Credit Corporation v.
Molina .... This court cannot but fully agree with the decision and judgment of Judge
Younger in that case and I make the same judgment here." Id. at 18, col. 1.
5. 4 A. Corbin, Contracts § 892, at 585 (1951) ; 3 S. Williston, Contracts § 432, at 177-80
(3d ed. W. Jaeger 1960) ; Restatement of Contracts § 167(1) (1932) ; Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 168(1)-(3) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1968); 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments § 102
(1963).
6. See, e.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(3)(a) (Supp. 1969); N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-206(1)
(1964) ; see notes 8, 10 infra.
7. See San Francisco Sec. Corp. v. Phoenix Motor Co., 25 Ariz. 531, 220 P. 229 (1923);
Dearborn Motors Credit Corp. v. Neel, 184 Kan. 437, 337 P.2d 992 (1959); Unico v. Owen,
50 N.J. 101, 123-26, 232 A.2d 405, 417-18 (1967). Contra, Root v. John Deere Co., 413
S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1967); Walter J. Hieb Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp., 332 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1960) ; cf. Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper:
The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 48, 75 (1966).
8. See N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(3) (a) (Supp. 1969). Similar statutes exist in California
(Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 2983.5 (West Supp. 1969)), and in Delaware (Del. Code Ann. it. 6,
§ 4312 (Supp. 1969)).
9. "Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or
lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert against
an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the seller or lessor is enforce-
able by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without notice
of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted against a
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under the Article on Commercial Paper
(Article 3)." See also Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 2.404, Alt. A: "With respect to a
consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or lease primarily for an agricul-
tural purpose, an assignee of the rights of the seller or lessor is subject to all claims and
defenses of the buyer or lessee against the seller or lessor arising out of the sale or lease
notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary, but the assignee's liability under this section
may not exceed the amount owing to the assignee at the time the claim or defense is
asserted against the assignee. Rights of the buyer or lessee under this section can only be
asserted as a matter of defense to or set-off against a claim by the assignee." See Murphy,
Lawyers for the Poor View the UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 298, 319 (1969). Article 9 of the
U.C.C. covers "any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security
interest in personal property or fixtures" and "any sale of accounts, contract rights or
chattel paper" concerning any fixtures or personal property within the jurisdiction of the
state. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a)-(b) (1964); see N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-106 (Supp. 1969). Note,
however, that N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-104(f) (1964) excludes from coverage of Article 9 "an assign-
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sulation of the assignee from defenses and claims available to the obligor
against the assignor. To be so protected, however, the assignor must qualify
as a good faith purchaser for value and acquire his rights unaware of any such
claims and defenses. Regardless of his position, the assignee remains subject
to the "real" defenses which are available against a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument. 0 In addition, the U.C.C. provision is made expressly
subject to "any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers
or lessees of consumer goods . . .
As previously mentioned, good faith is a sine qua non of an assignee who
wishes to remain immune from defenses which the obligor has available against
the assignor. The U.C.C. supplies a general definition for the term, providing:
"'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."'-'
ment of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper which is for the purpose of collection
only . . . ." Although this section appears to exclude the applicability of Article 9 of the
U.C.C. to the transactions involved in the case, based upon the sketchy facts provided by
the court, the Official Commentary to that section provides that "[paragraph (f) excludes
from the Article certain transfers of such intangibles which, by their nature, have nothing
to do with commercial financing transactions." Thus, since it is obvious that the transactions
essentially involved commercial financing, the exception provided in § 9-104(f) is inapplicable.
10. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-206(1) (1964). These "real" defenses are enumerated in N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 3-305 (1964). Basically, they include infancy, incapacity, duress, illegality or fraud in the
underlying transaction, discharge in insolvency or any other defense of which the holder
has notice in taking the instrument.
11. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-206(1) (1964). New York has enacted Pers. Prop. Law § 403(3)
(Supp. 1969): "No contract or obligation shall contain any provision by which: (a) The
buyer agrees not to assert against an assignee a claim or defense arising out of the sale,
but it may contain such a provision as to an assignee who acquires the contract, obligation or
obligation together with any related note in good faith and for value and to whom the buyer
has not mailed written notice of the facts giving rise to the claim or defense within ten days
after such assignee mails to the buyer, at his address shown on the contract or obligation,
notice of the assignment." N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-203(2) (1964) provides that a transaction
can be subject to both Article 9 of the Code and Article 10 of the Personal Property Law
(which contains § 403(3)), although the latter article is controlling in case of conflict.
An obvious conflict between N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(3) (Supp. 1969) and N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 9-206(1) (1964) is that the former requires a written notice of the defective performance,
while the latter does not. See also Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 2.404(1), Alt. B:
"With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or lease
primarily for an agricultural purpose, an agreement by the buyer or lessee not to assert
against an assignee a claim or defense arising out of the sale or lease is enforceable only
by an assignee not related to the seller or lessor who acquires the buyer's or lessee's contract
in good faith and for value, who gives the buyer or lessee notice of the assignment as
provided in this section and who, within 3 months after the mailing of the notice of assign-
ment, receives no written notice of the facts giving rise to the buyer's or lesee's claim
or defense. This agreement is enforceable only with respect to claims or defenses which
have arisen before the end of the 3-month period after notice was mailed." See Murphy,
supra note 9, at 319-20.
12. N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1964). The definitions in Article 1 of the Code are
applicable to all articles of the U.C.C., unless additional requirements are stated for a
particular article. For example, in sales transactions covered by Article 2, "'Good faith'
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The thrust of this definition had been previously adopted by other Uniform
Acts---"A thing is done 'in good faith' . . . when it is in fact done honestly,
whether it be done negligently or not."'3 Thus, the approach of the U.C.C.
and prior Uniform Acts to "good faith" is the subjective or "white-heart"
standard-a party's good faith is to be determined by what he actually knows
or willfully ignores, and not by what he, as a reasonably prudent man, should
have known-the objective test.1 4 Thus the subjective standard consists of
actual knowledge or willful ignorance, while the objective test essentially com-
prises negligence or failure to inquire.
Obviously, an assignee cannot be acting in "good faith" if his conscious ob-
jective is to disregard or even defeat the rights of the obligor.' r Nevertheless,
the existence of bad faith or collusion between the assignor and the assignee
more often than not presents difficult problems of proof. In Nassau Discount
Corp. v. Allen,' 6 for example, the trial court found that the existence of a
printed assignment clause containing the assignee's name, and other references
by name to the assignee throughout the contract between the buyer and the
assignor, sufficiently indicated the assignee's intent to defeat the buyer's rights.
The appellate court, however, thought differently, indicating that the facts
elicited were insufficient to establish bad faith, and ordered a new trial on the
question of the extent of the assignee's knowledge. 17 Nevertheless, extreme
cases of obvious collusion have been countered by a different theory. Commer-
cial Credit Co. v. Childs,18 for example, held that a finance company which had
in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1964). Sea
Norman v. World Wide Distribs., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
13. Uniform Bills of Lading Act § 53(2); Uniform Sales Act § 76(2); Uniform Stock
Transfer Act § 22(2); Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act § 58(2). These acts have been
superceded by various sections found in U.C.C. arts. 7, 2, 8 and 7 respectively.
14. Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Colum. L.
Rev. 798, 812 (1958) ; Felsenfeld, Knowledge as a Factor in Determining Priorities Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 246, 264 (1967).
15. Glens Falls Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sansivere, 136 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (Saratoga
County Ct. 1955). "He who seeks protection as a holder in due course must have dealt
fairly and honestly in acquring the instrument, as to the rights of prior parties .... " In
re Stroudsburg Security Trust Co., 145 Pa. Super. 44, 48, 20 A.2d 890, 892 (1941).
16. 44 Misc. 2d 1007, 255 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Civ. Ct.), rev'd, 47 Misc. 2d 671, 262 N.Y.S.2d
967 (App. T. 1965); see 65 Colum. L. Rev. 733 (1965).
17. 47 Misc. 2d at 671-72, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
18. 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940). Swanson v. Commercial Acceptance Corp.,
381 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1967) contains a summary of the judicial reasoning for and against
the party-to-the-transaction rule. See Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 220 Ark. 56,
247 S.W.2d 1 (1952); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal.
2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); United Sec. Corp. v. Franklin, 180 A.2d 505 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App. 1962); C.I.T. Corp. v. Emmons, 197 So. 662 (La. Ct. App. 1940). The cases are col-
lected in Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 8, 134-57 (1955). It is a well settled rule in many jurisdictions
that the privileges afforded a good faith assignee, or a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument are negated when that party has intimate knowledge of the transaction between
the principals. Such knowledge negates the possible injury to the innocent party, and thus
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prepared the contract, financed the transaction, and received an assignment
within one day of the transaction was not a good faith purchaser, but a party-
to-the-transaction from its inception-evidently a few steps beyond bad faith.
This position, however, has been criticized as essentially fallacious. 10 The fi-
nance company is considered to be a party to the transaction for the purpose
of impugning its status as a holder in due course or a good faith assignee, yet
would not be held liable for breach of warranty in an action commenced by
the obligor for damage caused by defective goods sold by the retailer.? Never-
theless, however valid may be the above criticism, the rationale of the party-
to-the-transaction doctrine is fundamentally sound-one who has been a signif-
icant economic force in the transaction should not be afforded the protection
of an innocent party.
Taking its cue from the Official Commentary to U.C.C. § 1-201(19) which
states that good faith "means at least what is here stated," the court in Star
Credit found that the plaintiff had demonstrated a lack of good faith in ac-
quiring the assignments. 21 The court premised this finding primarily upon a
discussion of factors more closely related to the issue of unconscionability than
that of good faith-i.e., defendants' lack of bargaining power and commercial
sophistication.22 It read the printed assignment clause on the reverse of the
contract as a provision which obviously had not been bargained for, and which
most likely could not have been varied. Such a bargain, aptly termed a con-
tract of adhesion or a "pad contract," is one in which a party has little or no
bargaining power-he must "take it or leave it."23 While it may be true that
adhesion contracts are not necessarily illegal or unfair in themselves, 24 although
various provisions have been held contrary to public policy,2- the court in-
dicated that lack of bargaining power was a highly relevant consideration
regarding the existence of good faith during the transaction.2-0
Related to the question of adhesion contracts is the commercial ineptness
those freedoms from defenses available to the obligor against the assignor are not acquired
by those who are in a position to know of the defenses prior to taking the assignment_
See Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 109-10, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (1967); American Plan Corp. v.
Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E2d 886 (1968).
19. Littlefield, supra note 7, at 68-70. See Comment, Negotiable Instruments Law--"Close
Connexity" and the Finance Company as a Holder in Due Course, 18 La. L. Rev. 322 (1958).
20. Littlefield, supra note 7, at 68-70.
21. 59 Misc. 2d at 294, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
22. Id. at 293, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
23. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank,
J., dissenting); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 632 (1943); Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts,
35 Temp. L.Q. 125, 128-30 (1962).
24. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948); Schmidt v. Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 735, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Dist. CL App. 1969); Unico
v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 111, 232 A.2d 405, 411 (1967). But cf. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Con-
tracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1072, 1088-89 (1953).
25. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
26. 59 Misc. 2d at 293, 298 N.YS.2d at 574.
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of buyers. The court indicated that while the defendants were literate, they
were not possessed of knowledge of the precise meaning of the "cut-off" provi-
sions in the contracts.27 Cognizance of the lack of commercial experience of one
party to a transaction is certainly not a new development in the law,28 and
presumably the current trend is away from the principle of the Restatement
of Contracts that "[o]ne who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who
manifests acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should reasonably
understand to be an offer or proposed contract, is bound by the contract,
though ignorant of the terms of the writing or of its proper interpretation.12
While ignorance might be a defense for some, lack of it may well mean liability
for others.30
By indicating that the above two factors were highly relevant to a deter-
mination of the plaintiff's good faith, the court resolved that issue in a novel
and interesting manner. "Good faith" essentially relates to the performance of
the contract, while unconscionability primarily concerns its formation and its
terms.31 Since the problems of commercial inexperience and adhesion obviously
arise at or before the time the buyer signed the contract, i.e., the formation
stage, these difficulties should have been interpreted to resolve the issue of
unconscionable formation rather than good faith performance. The Official
Commentary to U.C.C. § 2-302, the provision relating to unconscionability,
however, states that "[t]he principle [unconscionability] is one of the preven-
tion of oppression and unfair surprise ... and not of disturbance of allocation
of risks because of superior bargaining power." Since the waiver of defense
clauses were merely the result of superior bargaining power, the situation could
not have been validly treated under the principle of unconscionability. Never-
theless, the court related adhesion and commercial ineptness to a determination
of the assignee's good faith, i.e., the performance of the contract.
In addition to the above two considerations, the court pointed to several
factors which were indicative of a conspiracy between the assignor and the
assignee, namely, the assignment of each contract within twenty-four hours,
27. Id.
28. See Comment, Unconscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 109
U. Pa. L. Rev. 401, 409-10 (1961).
29. Restatement of Contracts § 70 (1932). Accord, Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 23, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964); see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) for a case exemplifying the trend away from the
Restatement position.
30. In Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Haskew, 194 Ark. 549, 108 S.W.2d 908 (1937) the
court took cognizance of the fact that the defendant was an adult teacher who should have
understood the warranty provisions of the contract he signed. This is merely a restatement
of the rule that a court will not remake a contract so as to structure a better bargain than
what competent parties have already made. Accord, Weiland Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Whitney, 40
lI. App. 2d 70, 91, 188 N.E.2d 756, 765 (1963); Kahn v. Janowski, 191 Md. 279, 60 A.2d
519 (1948); Mountain Springs Ass'n v. Wilson, 81 N.J. Super. 564, 575, 196 A.2d 270, 277
(Super. Ct. 1963) ; Harnish v. Shannon, 392 Pa. 419, 141 A.2d 347 (1958).
31. 1 Report of the N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of the Uniform Commercial
Code 658 (1955).
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the identical account numbers on the assignor's contracts and the assignee's
records, the strong probability that the defendants' credit rating had not been
checked by the plaintiff despite its statement to the contrary, and the discount
rate of twenty percent at which plaintiff took both assignments. 32 The court
failed, however, to delve into the question of whether Star Credit was actually
aware of the seller's plans to go out of business, but from the foregoing facts,
merely surmised that the assignee's knowledge of the transaction itself negated
its alleged good faith. 3 Although the court did not elaborate on the point, it
can be seen that the entire transaction, from the inclusion of the clauses in the
contracts to their ultimate assignments to the plaintiff, was structured so as to
enable the assignee to defeat the defendants' rights.
The defendants had actually signed two contract forms, but the evidence
persuaded the court that there was in effect only one contract for both the
freezer and the food.V 4 A finding that only one contract rather than two exists
is generally based upon the intent of the parties to the transaction, and such
circumstances as separate delivery of each article, or separate prices for each
commodity, do not conclusively establish the existence of separate contracts.35
However, the evidence before the court in Star Credit demonstrated that Peo-
ples Foods, Inc. and Peoples Food Packaging Corp., while purportedly separate
entities, shared the same vice-president, had the same address, and used iden-
tical form contracts. In addition, both contracts contained a provision to the
effect that, if both a freezer contract and a food plan contract were executed,
the two were to be considered as a single contract.30
Since the court found that the contract had been substantially breached by
the failure of the assignor to provide all the food agreed upon, the assignee,
having lost its privileged status, was held subject to the defense of substantial
failure of consideration, and the contract was rescinded.3r
The court in Star Credit was ultimately confronted with a delicate policy
question, namely, the balancing of the need of legitimate retail merchants to
acquire working capital by discounting their "paper," with the protection which
must be afforded consumers from unscrupulous tradesmen.38 Such a balancing
32. 59 Msc. 2d at 293-94, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
33. "We are therefore persuaded that the sellers entered into these contracts not primarily
to sell a freezer and food to the Molinas, but primarily to obtain commercial paper for
assignment to Star; and that Star accepted the assignments with full knowledge of the
seller's conduct and intention. Id.
34. Id. at 295, 298 N.YS.2d at 575-76.
35. Bethea v. Investors Loan Corp., 197 A.2d 448 (D.C. Alun. Ct. App. 1964); Farmers
Union Coop. Elevator Fed'n v. Carter, 152 Neb. 266, 40 N.W.2d 870 (1950); Sal's Furniture
Co. v. Peterson, 86 RI. 203, 133 A.2d 770 (1957).
36. 59 Misc. 2d at 295, 298 N.YS.2d at 575-76.
37. Id. at 295, 298 N.YS.2d at 576. The defendants had also asserted two other defenses
against Star Credit, namely, fraud in the inducement and unconscionability. They failed,
however, to produce any substantiating evidence for either, and accordingly the court de-
clined to further consider those defenses.
38. See Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1969); American
Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968); Implement Credit Corp.
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essentially involves a question of the allocation of the risks of the trade. As
the Supreme Court of Florida stated: "It may be that our holding here will
require some changes in business methods and will impose a greater burden on
the finance companies. We think the buyer-Mr. & Mrs. General Public-
should have some protection somewhere along the line. We believe the finance
company is better able to bear the risk of the dealer's insolvency than the
buyer and in a far better position to protect his interests against unscrupulous
and insolvent dealers."3 9 Furthermore, this allocation requires special considera-
tion for both legitimate businessmen and consumers, "[b]ut the need for
special care in application should not foreclose the adoption of the rule [of
balancing interests] and its application in a proper case."'40 The retail merchant
and the finance company go hand in hand. As one court has expressed it:
"The finance company and the merchant-seller are as a fact engaged in one
business, like Longfellow's description of man and woman, useless one without
the other. To pretend that they are separate and distinct enterprises is to draw
the veil of fiction over the face of fact."4' The court in Star Credit utilized
workable criteria in its determination of the finance company's good faith
without holding that the financier had been a party to the transaction from its
inception.
The result in Star Credit was unquestionably just-no one appreciates paying
for what he will not receive, especially when there is an aroma of fraud in the
air. Even if recent cases may be considered consumer oriented, it is necessary
to keep in mind that those institutions best able to protect themselves-those
with unquestioned superior bargaining power-should bear the risks inherent
in the market place.
v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954). For a discussion of the balancing of In-
terests between consumers and finance companies, see Hogan, A Survey of State Retail
Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 Corn. L.Q. 38, 65-67 (1958).
39. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953).
40. Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739, 743 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1969).
41. Buffalo Indus. Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 744, 296 N.Y.S. 783, 785-86
(Buffalo City Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
